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Abstract 
This dissertation proposes a novel approach for improving learning using testing.  
A growing body of research has demonstrated that testing can be a powerful tool not just 
for assessing - but also for enhancing learning.  However, previous research has only 
demonstrated that testing can increase past learning  (i.e., learning from materials 
encountered prior to testing).  By contrast, this dissertation proposes that testing can also 
be used to potentiate future learning (i.e., learning from new materials encountered for 
the first time after testing).  According to the proposed model, testing potentiates future 
learning by producing generative knowledge bases.  These generative knowledge bases 
are composed of featurally-rich memory traces that are fluently retrieved during future 
text processing, supporting comprehension, learning, and even conceptual change.  This 
proposal is tested in three experiments using naturalistic expository texts.  Experiment 1 
replicated previous findings of test-enhanced learning and extended them to rich 
expository texts on topics in psychological science: being tested on a text increased the 
amount of information participants learned from that text relative to an equivalent amount 
of restudy, as indicated by delayed tests administered a week later.  Experiment 2 
demonstrated that testing potentiates future learning and conceptual change: being tested 
on a text increased the amount of information that participants learned from a new, but 
related, text that negated, qualified and elaborated the original text.  Experiment 3 
demonstrated that testing can potentiate future learning as measured by educationally 
relevant tasks: being tested on a recently read text improved students’ critical essays and 
short answer questions about a new text encountered after testing.  Experiment 3 also 
demonstrated that strongly held beliefs can interfere with the benefits of testing, 
preventing test-potentiated conceptual change.  These results contribute to and extend the 
emerging view of testing as a valuable tool for promoting learning and represent a new 
tool for improving learning from expository texts. 
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 1 
Overview 
Expository texts are central to learning at all stages of life.  But unfortunately, 
many children and adults struggle to comprehend the types of expository prose that fill 
textbooks, scholarly journals, and popular press articles (see Chapter 1 for a review of 
key reasons that readers fail to comprehend and learn from expository texts).  This 
dissertation presents a novel way of improving learning from expository tests.  Building 
upon recent research that has shown that testing can enhance past learning (i.e., learning 
of information encountered prior to testing) (for a review, see Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006a), we propose that testing can also be used to build generative knowledge bases that 
potentiate future learning (i.e. learning of new information encountered in future learning 
sessions).  These generative knowledge bases are composed of featurally-rich memory 
traces that are fluently retrieved during future text processing, supporting comprehension, 
learning, and even conceptual change.  This proposal is investigated in three experiments 
using ecologically valid expository texts.   
Testing is often thought of as a way of assessing learning (e.g. classroom tests), 
ensuring political accountability (e.g., testing administered under policies like No Child 
Left Behind), and selecting individuals for limited spaces in educational institutions (e.g., 
tests like the SAT or ACT).  However, a growing body of research from the cognitive and 
educational sciences demonstrates that testing can also be a tool for enhancing learning 
(e.g., Glover, 1989; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b).  When participants are tested on 
materials they have already been exposed to, they typically learn more than if they spend 
an equivalent amount of time restudying the materials.  For example, if participants read 
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an expository text and then take a recall test, they typically learn more than if they spend 
the same amount of time rereading the text.  This enhanced learning is not usually 
apparent immediately, but is revealed by assessments administered days, weeks, and even 
months after testing (Butler & Roediger, 2007; Thompson, Wenger, & Bartling, 1978).  
The utility of testing in enhancing learning from previously encountered materials is 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
The novel proposal presented in this dissertation is that  – in addition to enhancing 
past learning – testing can potentiate future learning.  According to this proposal, testing 
builds a generative knowledge base that enables participants to learn more from new, but 
related, materials encountered after testing.  For example, if a participant reads an 
introductory text about a topic and is then tested on it, she will learn more from 
subsequent texts that build upon the ideas in the introductory text than if she had simply 
restudied the introductory passage.  Testing potentiates learning by building generative 
knowledge bases that promote the fluent retrieval of prior knowledge via automatic, 
similarity-driven processes.  This fluent retrieval increases the integration of tested 
knowledge with new textual information, improving learning and comprehension.  In the 
context of learning from a refutational expository text, fluent retrieval increases the 
coactivation of conflicting information, promoting conceptual change.  The proposed 
model of test-potentiated learning is introduced in Chapter 3. 
 This proposed model was investigated in three experiments that employed 
naturalistic expository texts.  Experiment I investigated whether testing can be used to 
increase the knowledge learned from materials encountered prior to testing.  In this 
 3 
experiment, participants read two naturalistic expository texts that presented arguments 
in favor of using discovery learning and learning styles to improve student learning.  
Participants were tested on one text and restudied the other for an equivalent amount of 
time.  A week later, participants were tested on both texts to determine whether they had 
learned more from the tested or the restudied text.  Consistent with previous research that 
has demonstrated that testing can enhance past learning, participants recalled a higher 
proportion of ideas from the text they were tested on than from the text they had 
restudied.  Experiment 1 is presented in Chapter 4. 
Experiment 2 investigated whether the increased knowledge built by testing 
transfers to new learning experiences, potentiating the learning of new information from 
new materials.  In this experiment, participants again read the two texts that presented 
arguments in favor of using discovery learning and learning styles.  After reading these 
texts, participants were tested on one and spent an equivalent amount of time restudying 
the other.  A week later, participants read two new texts that presented arguments that 
refuted, qualified, and elaborated the claims presented in the original texts.  After reading 
these texts, participants were tested to determine whether their learning had been 
potentiated by earlier testing on a related text.  In contrast to prior experiments that have 
explored whether testing can potentiate the learning of previously encountered ideas to 
which a participant is re-exposed after tested, Experiment 2 explored whether testing can 
potentiate the learning of new ideas encountered for the first time after testing.  
Corroborating the proposed model of test-potentiated learning, having been previously 
tested on a related text a week before increased the amount of information that 
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participants learned from a new text that refuted and elaborated the tested text.  
Critically, testing increased the subsequent learning of ideas that negated and qualified 
originally tested ideas, indicating that testing potentiated conceptual change.  Experiment 
2 is presented in Chapter 5. 
Experiment 3 investigated whether testing can potentiate critical comprehension 
and learning in the context of two educationally relevant tasks.  Although the results of 
the first two experiments demonstrated that testing can both enhance the knowledge that 
readers build and potentiate their future learning of new ideas, these learning gains were 
assessed using free-recall tasks.  Free recall is a convenient tools for psychological 
research, but it is not directly relevant to educational practice.  As a first step in 
demonstrating the potential educational utility of test-potentiated learning, Experiment 3 
investigated whether prior testing could improve participants’ performance on critical 
essays and short answer questions by enhancing their past learning and potentiating their 
future learning and critical comprehension.  
Experiment 3 also investigated whether strong prior beliefs could prevent 
participants from benefiting from testing on ideas that contradicted these beliefs.  Many 
people hold strong beliefs that everyone learns in different ways and that education is 
most effective when teaching is targeted to these “styles”.  Strongly held misconceptions 
like these can prevent readers from learning and/or using scientifically accurate ideas that 
conflict with these beliefs.   
In Experiment 3, participants first read a text that introduced key criticisms of the 
validity and utility of learning styles approaches to education.  After reading, one half of 
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the participants were tested on the text and the other half restudied it for an equivalent 
amount of time.  One week later, participants read a new text that presented an argument 
in favor of learning styles approaches to education.  Participants were then asked to write 
an essay that critically evaluated this text and to answer a set of short answer questions.  
Consistent with previous research into test-enhanced learning, participants who were 
tested learned more ideas from the Day 1 text than participants who had restudied it.  
Corroborating the proposed model of test-potentiated learning, testing on Day 1 also 
enabled participants to learn more information from the new text they read on Day 8.  
This enhanced and potentiated learning, allowed participants to generate richer responses 
to the essay stem and short answer questions.  However, participants’ performance was 
also characterized by an interaction between their belief in learning styles and whether 
they had been tested on Day 1.  While participants who were skeptical of learning styles 
approaches to education integrated more ideas from the critical Day 1 text into their 
responses when they had been tested on it, participants who strongly believed in the 
efficacy of learning styles failed to integrate more critical ideas from the Day 1 text 
regardless of whether they had been tested.  Experiment 3 is presented in Chapter 6. 
The results of these three experiments represent a significant expansion of our 
understanding of the role of testing in learning.  They build upon the growing recognition 
of testing as more than a tool for assessing learning and demonstrate that testing can be 
used to both enhance past learning and potentiate future learning.  Critically for potential 
educational applications, these results demonstrate that testing can amplify conceptual 
change and enhance/potentiate learning from the types of rich materials that students are 
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likely to encounter in the real world.  A full discussion of the results of these 
experiments is presented in Chapter 7, and suggestions for future research are presented 
in Chapter 8. 
 7 
Chapter 1: The Difficulty of Learning from Expository Texts 
Expository texts are central to learning at all stages of life.  But unfortunately, 
many children and adults struggle to comprehend the types of expository prose that fill 
textbooks, scholarly journals, and popular press articles (RAND Reading Study Group, 
2002).  American students in particular demonstrate shortcomings in the comprehension 
of expository texts that have implications for both civic engagement and national 
competitiveness (RAND Reading Study Group, 2002).  For example, the results of the 
Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 2006 (PIRLS 2006) indicated that 
American 4th graders were significantly worse at comprehending text for “informational 
purposes” (i.e., comprehending expository texts) than they were at comprehending texts 
for “literary purposes” (i.e., comprehending narrative texts) (Mullis, Martin, Kennedy, 
Foy, 2007).  The results of PIRLS 2006 also indicated that American students were 
significantly worse than students from 12 countries in the 40 country sample in 
understanding texts for informational purposes.  Although the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) does not report separate results for expository and narrative 
texts, PISA assessments place a heavy emphasis on students’ ability to comprehend and 
learn from expository texts.  The results of PISA 2009 indicated that American 15 year 
olds’ reading ability was only “average” and was significantly worse than the 
performance of students in Asian countries and regions like Shanghai-China, Korea, 
Hong-Kong, and Singapore; European countries like Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Norway; and Commonwealth countries like Canada, New Zealand, and Australia 
against whom we compete in the global marketplace (OECD, 2010).      
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Why do students have so much difficulty comprehending and learning from 
expository text? A key reason that readers struggle to comprehend expository texts is 
because they fail to recruit relevant prior knowledge (Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; 
McNamara, E. Kintsch, Songer, Kintsch, 1996).  When readers do not possess relevant 
prior knowledge, they may generate incomplete and/or erroneous representations of a text 
(Schneider & Korkel, 1989; Steffensen, Joag-Dev, & Anderson, 1979).  Even when 
readers do have relevant prior knowledge, the constraints of the human cognitive system 
may prevent them from fluently integrating it with textual information, preventing them 
from generating accurate, fully elaborated text representations (Kinstch, 1988; McKoon 
& Ratcliff, 1992).  
Prior Knowledge and Text Comprehension 
Successful text comprehension requires that readers integrate relevant textual 
information and prior knowledge at appropriate times during reading (Kintsch, 1988; 
Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Thibadeau et al., 1982).  This integration is constrained by 
limits in how much information a reader can maintain and process in working memory 
(WM) (Fletcher, 1981; Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; Just & Carpenter, 1992; McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1992), by restrictions in how quickly and selectively readers can retrieve 
information from long term memory (LTM) (Anderson, Budui, & Reder, 2001; Cook, 
Halleran, & O’Brien, 1998), and by the nature of readers’ prior knowledge (Bartlett, 
1932; Chiesi et al., 1979).  Readers have a limited amount of WM resources that they 
must allocate to both the processing and short-term storage of textual information and 
prior knowledge (Fletcher, 1981, 1986; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kintsch & van Dijk, 
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1978).  Although readers can elaborate the information that is temporarily held in WM 
with information retrieved from LTM, retrieval from LTM can be alternatively slow and 
selective or fast but imprecise (Anderson et al., 2001; Cook et al., 1998).   
Readers must rely upon their prior knowledge to fill gaps in elliptical texts 
(Bower, Black & Turner, 1979), explain how textual events are causally related 
(Trabasso, Secco, & van den Broek, 1984), and construct mental models that transcend 
linguistically encoded relations (Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Johnson-Laird, 
1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983).  To understand the critical role that recruiting relevant 
background knowledge plays in text comprehension, consider the following example: 
With hocked gems financing him, our hero bravely defied all scornful laugher that 
tried to prevent his scheme.  “Your eyes deceive,” he had said, “an egg, not a 
table, correctly typifies this unexplored planet”.  Now three sturdy sisters sought 
proof, forging along, sometimes through calm vastness, yet more often over 
turbulent peaks and valleys.  Days became weeks as many doubters spread fearful 
rumors about the edge.  At last, from nowhere, welcome winged creatures 
appeared, signifying momentous success. (Dooling & Lachman, 1971) 
If you have never seen this text before, it was probably difficult to comprehend.  
However, if the appropriate title had been included (see footnote on next page), you 
would have most likely recruited relevant background knowledge and had little difficulty 
understanding the vague references that pervade this passage.          
 Although this example is a bit extreme, it demonstrates a fundamental principle of 
text comprehension: successful comprehension requires that readers recruit relevant 
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background knowledge during reading (Adams & Bruce, 1980; Bartlett, 1932; 
Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Walker & Yekovich, 1987).   When readers do not have 
relevant prior knowledge, they are entirely dependent on the information encoded in the 
words of a text.  As a result, they may generate inaccurate or incomplete representations 
of the underlying meaning of a text.  When readers do have access to relevant prior 
knowledge, they learn more from a text (e.g., Chiesi, et al., 1979; Recht & Leslie, 1988), 
they can understand ambiguous language (Wiley & Rayner, 2000), resolve subtle 
references (Walker & Yekovich, 1987), and make sense of even minimally coherent texts 
(McNamara et al., 1996).  When this prior knowledge is extensive, readers may even be 
able to circumvent limitations in their own general cognitive abilities (Schneider & 
Korkel, 1989; Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1989; Walker, 1987).1   
One way that prior knowledge facilitates text comprehension is by providing 
readers with information that can help them to elaborate or fill gaps in texts that are not 
fully coherent (McNamara, 2001; McNamara & Kintsch, 1996; McNamara et al., 1996).  
For example, McNamara et al. (1996) had students who varied in prior knowledge read 
biology texts that varied in their level of coherence, ranging from a minimally coherent 
text that was locally but not globally coherent to a fully coherent text that included 
signals of the underlying structure of the text as well as language that explicitly explained 
the relations between text segments.  Students with high prior knowledge were able to 
employ their knowledge to construct a coherent representation of the minimally coherent 
text and actually learned more from this apparently impoverished text than from the fully 
                                                
1 Christopher Columbus Discovering America 
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coherent version.  Students with low prior knowledge learned little from the incoherent 
text because they were not able to recruit relevant knowledge during reading.  
Another way that prior knowledge facilitates text comprehension is by enabling 
readers to circumvent limitations in their general cognitive abilities (Schneider & Korkel, 
1989; Schneider et al., 1989; Walker, 1987).  For example, Schneider et al. (1989) had 
students who varied in general verbal ability and prior knowledge about soccer read texts 
that described soccer matches.  Students with low verbal ability who were soccer experts 
actually learned more from the texts than did students with high verbal ability who were 
soccer novices.  This result demonstrates that high domain knowledge can compensate 
for general cognitive deficits.  Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) have proposed that expert 
knowledge can allow readers to dramatically expand the information that they have 
quick, precise access to by exploiting over-learned LTM structures.  According to their 
theory of Long Term Working Memory (LT-WM), expertise allows readers to expand 
their WM in much the same way as chess masters use their expert knowledge to 
dramatically expand their WM for chess positions (Chase & Ericsson, 1982; Chase & 
Simon, 1973).    
 Deficits in prior knowledge may be especially culpable in the case of failed 
expository text comprehension.  Although life experiences may prepare readers to readily 
understand narrative texts, the knowledge structures that are necessary for understanding 
expository texts are often unique to a discipline and must be learned (Britton, Graesser, 
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Glynn, Hamilton, & Penland, 1983; Kintsch & Young, 1984)2.  The large amount of 
relevant knowledge that readers bring to narrative texts, such as knowledge about typical 
human activity and extensive experience with narrative story structures, may allow them 
to easily construct representations of narrative texts that capture large thematic relations 
(Britton, et al., 1983; Kintsch & Young, 1984).  By contrast, the relatively impoverished 
knowledge base that readers bring to most expository texts may drive them to focus on 
the processing of isolated information that is explicitly encoded in a text (McDaniel, 
Einstein, Dunay, & Cobb, 1986; McDaniel & Kerwin, 1987).    
Improving Prior Knowledge to Improve Comprehension 
Given the centrality of prior knowledge to successful text comprehension, it 
makes sense to try to improve readers’ comprehension by helping them to build requisite 
prior knowledge or helping them to recruit the relevant knowledge they already possess.  
Several methods have been used to help readers build the prior knowledge necessary for 
comprehending a text.  These include “advance organizers” (Ausubel, 1960) and short 
lessons that aim to introduce relevant content.  
Attempts to provide readers with requisite background knowledge through short 
targeted lessons have yielded inconsistent results.  For example, McNamara and Kintsch 
(1996) found that giving readers a short lesson on the Vietnam War prior to reading a 
difficult text on the conflict in Indochina only helped readers who already had high prior 
knowledge about the war.  In fact, these short lesson actually hurt readers who had low 
prior knowledge.   However, other studies have found that exposing readers to relevant 
                                                
2 While the boundaries between different text types are definitely fuzzy, cognitive and educational 
psychology have historically differentiated between two super-classes, expository and narrative texts.  The 
purpose of expository texts being to inform, and the purpose of narrative texts to entertain.   
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knowledge can increase the amount they subsequently recall from a passage (Mayer, 
1983; Rawson & Kintsch, 2002, 2004).  For example, Rawson and Kintsch (2002, 
Experiment 1) had participants read a series of short texts about governmental 
interventions in the labor market.  Before reading, half of the participants read 
information about the issues covered in the texts.  After reading, all participants 
completed a free- and a cued- recall test.  Participants who read background information 
prior to reading produced more textual information on the free recalls than did 
participants who had not.   
Advance organizers are intended to introduce and/or activate conceptual 
structures that can help a reader subsume or anchor new textual material (Ausubel, 1960; 
Mayer, 1979).   The potential efficacy of advance organizers was investigated extensively 
in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.   The results of this research can be best summarized as 
“confused” (Hartley & Davies, 1976, p. 256).  While many reviewers of this research 
have concluded that advance organizers do little to improve learning from texts (e.g., 
Barnes & Clawson, 1975; Faw & Waller, 1976), others have concluded that advance 
organizers can improve learning if properly constructed (Corkill, 1992; Mayer, 1979). 
The sporadic success of these two methods suggests that it can be difficult to help 
readers build the knowledge they need to understand a text.  Looking forward, the 
proposed model of test-potentiated comprehension aims to overcome this difficulty by 
using testing to not only help readers build relevant knowledge but to increase the fluency 
with which this knowledge is retrieved during future reading, supporting comprehension 
and learning.   
 14 
Misconceptions, Beliefs, and Learning 
It is important to recognize that not all prior knowledge facilitates learning.  In 
fact, readers often possess knowledge or beliefs that can actually interfere with learning 
(Alvermann, Smith, & Readence, 1985; Diakidoy & Kendeou, 2001; Kardash & Scholes, 
1996; Kendeou & van den Broek, 2007).  For example, a student who believes that 
seasonal change is the result of the earth being closer to the sun during the summer than 
during the winter can read a text that describes the actual mechanism of seasonal change 
(the Earth’s tilt and elliptical orbit) without revising their misconception (Broughton, 
Sinatra, & Reynolds., 2010).  In general, misconceptions are highly resistant to revision. 
In the case of strongly held beliefs (e.g., a belief in creationism), readers’ strong 
commitment to a misconception can further reduce the likelihood that they will learn a 
new concept from a text (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Kardash & Scholes, 1996).   
Changing misconceptions and erroneous beliefs.  According to models of 
conceptual change that have emerged from modern philosophy of science and science 
education, there are several pre-requisites for changing misconceptions.  These 
prerequisites include dissatisfaction with an existing concept, the presence of an 
intelligible new concept, and a demonstration of the plausibility and fruitfulness of a new 
concept (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982).3 In addition to these philosophically-
inspired prerequisites, educational, cognitive, and social psychology have identified 
several additional factors that are key to fostering conceptual changes (Dole & Sinatra, 
1998).  For example, conceptual change is most likely to occur when learners are highly 
                                                
3 In the context of scientific theory building, conceptual change is also driven by “the possibility of a 
fruitful research program” associated with the new concept (p. 214 Posner et al., 1982)  
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engaged, when a topic is personally relevant or interesting, and when learners have a 
high “need for cognition” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gregoire, 
2003; Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993).  
In the context of learning from texts, conceptual change is promoted when new 
concepts are presented in a refutational structure (for a review, see Guzzetti, Snyder, 
Glass, & Gamas, 1993).   In a refutational text, a misconception is explicitly highlighted 
and then the correct concept is presented.  For example, consider the following excerpt 
from a refutational text about seasonal change:  
Many people believe that the changing seasons are the result of the Earth being 
closer to the Sun during the summer months and farther away from the Sun during 
the winter months. Perhaps you hold similar beliefs. However, seasons do not 
change because the distance between the Earth and the Sun changes. In fact, Earth 
is closer to the Sun in winter and farther away from the Sun in summer. Seasonal 
change is the result of two features of the Earth: its tilted axis and its elliptical 
orbit around the Sun. (p. 421 Broughton et al., 2010) 
Notice that this text explicitly highlights potential misconceptions in the opening 
sentence “Many people believe that the changing seasons are the result of the Earth being 
closer to the Sun during the summer months and farther away from the Sun during the 
winter months.”  It then continues to explain the actual mechanism for seasonal change.   
When participants with misconceptions read a refutational text, they are more 
likely to revise their misconception than if they read a non-refutational text (Broughton et 
al., 2010; Diakidoy & Kendeou, 2001; Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Kendeou & van den 
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Broek, 2008; Guzzetti, et al., 1993).  One proposed mechanisms for this change is the 
cognitive conflict caused by the co-activation of misconceptions and new concepts that is 
evoked by a refutational structure (van den Broek & Kendeou, 2008).  Another 
mechanism for conceptual change may be that refutational texts are easier to process than 
their non-refutational counterparts (Broughton et al., 2010).   
Looking ahead to the experiments, an important dimension of Experiments 2 and 
3 is investigating whether testing can help participants learn ideas that contradict prior 
knowledge.  These experiments feature texts that refute commonly held beliefs about 
learning, such as the belief that students learn best when taught in a matched “learning 
style”.  Experiment 2 investigates whether testing can set the stage for students to learn 
more from refutational texts they encounter after testing.  Experiment 3 investigates 
whether prior testing can improve participants’ responses to critical essays and short-
answer questions that require integrating conflicting ideas.  Experiment 3 also 
investigates whether participants’ prior beliefs interact with the potential benefits of 
testing by reducing their learning/use of ideas that conflict with their beliefs.  
 
 17 
Chapter 2: Enhancing Past Learning with Testing 
We usually think of tests as a way of assessing learning (e.g., classroom tests or 
accountability tests administered in accordance with policies like No Child Left Behind), 
diagnosing individuals, incentivizing study, or selecting individuals for limited spaces in 
educational institutions (e.g., tests like the ACT and SAT).  However, a growing body of 
research indicates that testing can also be a powerful learning experience (for a review, 
see Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  In a typical investigation of what is widely known as 
the testing effect, researchers compare the effects of testing to other types of study.  For 
example, Roediger and Karpicke (2006b, Experiment 1) had students read two prose 
passages on unfamiliar biology topics.  After reading each passage, students either 
produced a free recall of the text (a type of test that emphasizes memory retrieval) or 
spent an equivalent amount of time restudying the passage.  On free recall tests two days 
or one week later, students produced more extensive free recalls of the text that they had 
been previously tested on than of the text that they had restudied, demonstrating 
enhanced learning of tested material.  
The Testing Effect 
A long history of research has demonstrated that testing can be used to enhance 
learning (e.g., Abbot, 1909; Gates, 1917; Glover, 1989; Spitzer, 1939).  In a typical 
investigation of the testing effect, participants study verbal materials and are either tested 
one or more times on these materials or spend an equivalent amount of time restudying 
them.  After a delay of one or more days, all participants are tested.  On this delayed test, 
participants who were initially tested on a set of materials typically outperform 
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participants who restudied the materials.   The testing effect (defined as better learning 
of tested than restudied material) has been reliably demonstrated for word lists 
(Congleton & Rajaram, 2011; Hogan & Kintsch, 1971) and paired associates (Allen, 
Mahler, Estes, 1969; Bartlett & Tulving, 1974; Estes, 1960), and – in a growing number 
of studies – for educationally-relevant materials (Agarwal, Karpicke, Kang, Roediger, & 
McDermott, 2008; Butler & Roediger, 2007; Chan, McDermott, & Roediger, 2006; 
Gates, 1917;  Glover, 1989; McDaniel & Fisher 1991; Nungester & Duchastel, 1982; 
Spitzer, 1939).  Because of this overwhelming evidence, testing is one of only two 
instructional practices that the Institute of Education Sciences has determined to have a 
“strong” level of support (Pashler et al., 2007).   
 The testing effect literature is characterized by three key findings.  First, the 
benefits of testing usually appear only after a delay (Runquist, 1983; Thompson et al., 
1978; Wenger, Thompson, & Bartling, 1980).  When final tests are administered 
immediately, restudying often produces better performance than initial testing.  This 
pattern changes after a delay (usually of a day or more) and often increases with longer 
and longer delays (Runquist, 1983).  For example, Thompson et al. (1978) had 
participants study word lists under repeated study or repeated test conditions and then 
take a free recall test after either 20 minutes or 48 hours.  On the test administered after 
only a 20 minute delay, participants who had repeatedly studied the text recalled more 
words.  On the test administered after a 48 hour delay, this pattern reversed, and 
participants who had been repeatedly tested recalled more.  This reversal has been 
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described by some authors as lower levels of forgetting following testing than 
following restudy (Izawa, 1966; Runquist, 1983) 
 Testing can also improve the organization of knowledge (Bregman & Weiner, 
1970; Congleton & Rajaram, 2011; Gates, 1917; Rosner, 1970; Zaromb & Roediger, 
2010).  For example, Zaromb and Roediger (2010) found that testing could increase both 
the subjective and objective organization of participants’ delayed recalls.  In two 
experiments, participants learned word lists in repeated study or study followed by testing 
conditions.  Words in each list were presented in a random order, but belonged to one of 
five taxonomic categories.   In the first experiment, repeated testing did not increase the 
degree to which participants clustered their recall with respect to these underlying 
categories (category clustering was near ceiling in all conditions), but it did increase the 
degree to which participants clustered their recalls with respect to their own idiosyncratic 
ordering4.   In a second experiment in which the materials were revised to avoid ceiling 
effects, testing increased objective organization as demonstrated by the degree to which 
participants recalled items from the same category together5.   
 A third finding that is not as well established as the first two is that testing also 
increases the speed with which tested information can be retrieved in the future (Allen et 
al., 1969; Eimas & Zeaman, 1963; Izawa, 1966).  For example, Allen et al. (1969) had 
participants learn paired associates (A-B pairs) under a variety of repeated study or 
testing conditions. After a twenty four hour delay, participants were given a series of 
cued recall tests (A-).  Participants were more accurate and faster in producing responses 
                                                
4 Subjective organization was measured using Sternberg & Tulving’s (1977) paired frequency measure. 
5 Objective organization was measured using ARC scores (Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971). 
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(B’s) when they had been previously tested.  These faster responses reflect an increase 
in the subsequent accessibility of tested information.  This increase in accessibility may 
be especially important for promoting text comprehension, because successful 
comprehension is contingent on the fluent retrieval of relevant information.  
Proposed Mechanisms for the Testing Effect 
Most contemporary accounts of the testing effect attribute the benefits of testing 
to retrieval from LTM (Allen et al., 1969; Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Glover, 1989).  These 
accounts are built on the assumption that retrieval directly alters the state of an item in 
memory (Bjork, 1975) and can be contrasted with alternative models that attribute the 
benefits of testing to the amount of processing or number of presentations that are 
produced by testing (cf, Dempster 1996; Glover, 1989).   
Amount of processing/rehearsal/study accounts.  Prior to the widespread 
adoption of retrieval-based accounts, several authors proposed that testing enhances 
learning in much the same way as study or presentation trials.  According to these 
accounts, testing enhances memory because it increases the amount of time participants 
dedicate to processing stimuli or provides participants with self-generated re-
presentations of stimuli (Bregman & Wiener, 1970; Thompson et al., 1978).  While these 
accounts can explain increased learning in experiments in which testing is contrasted with 
a condition that involves no re-presentation or processing of stimuli (e.g., Bartlett, 1977; 
Bartlett & Tulving, 1974; Darley & Murdock, 1971), they cannot explain the results of 
experiments in which testing is contrasted with a study condition in which stimuli is 
presented for an equivalent or even greater amount of time (Allen et al., 1969; Carrier & 
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Pashler, 1992; Hogan & Kintsch, 1970; Kuo & Hirshman, 1996).  For example, Carrier 
and Pashler (1992) compared participants’ learning of paired-associates in a pure study 
condition that involved continuous presentation of A-B pairs for 10 seconds to learning in 
a hybrid testing condition that involved five seconds of testing (A- presentation) followed 
by five seconds of full A-B pair presentation.  Despite the advantage of the pure study 
condition in terms of the amount of presentation time, on a delayed cued recall task (A-) 
participants produced significantly more associates (B’s) in the test condition than the 
study condition.  In the case of studies in which an equivalent amount of restudy time is 
contrasted with a free recall testing condition, accounts based on time and/or the number 
of presentations have difficulty explaining test-enhanced learning.  Not only is time 
equated in these studies, but since participants rarely reproduce 100 percent of stimuli 
during free recall testing, they are usually exposed to far fewer re-presentations of stimuli 
during testing than during restudy. 
Retrieval-based accounts.  In addition to the results of studies that have carefully 
equated the amount of time or number of presentations in study and test conditions, there 
are several additional reasons to believe that retrieval from LTM is the operant 
mechanism in producing the testing effect.  First, the testing effect is much weaker when 
testing only requires producing information from WM rather than retrieving information 
from LTM (Bjork, 1975; Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Gotz & Jacoby, 1974; Landauer & 
Eldridge, 1967).  For example, Gotz and Jacoby (1974) had participants learn short word 
lists in testing conditions where testing was either immediate or delayed by a number 
subtraction task.  Consistent with retrieval-based accounts of the testing effect, immediate 
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testing (which presumably elicited information held in WM) was far less effective than 
delayed testing (which presumably elicited the retrieval of information from LTM).  In 
educational contexts, the assumption that LTM retrieval plays a key role in producing the 
testing effect is supported by several decades of adjunct-question research.  In a meta-
analysis, Hamaker (1986) found that post-reading questions (i.e. questions that require 
retrieval from LTM) were more effective than pre-reading questions which may produce 
online attentional effects (Lewis & Mensink, 2012; Rothkopf & Billington, 1975) but 
may not elicit retrieval from LTM.   
A second reason to believe that LTM retrieval is the operant mechanism in the 
testing effect is that the effect tends to be more robust with recall than recognition tests 
(Carpenter & Delosh, 2006; Glover, 1989).  For example, Glover (1989, Experiment 4) 
had students read a prose passage and then take one of three tests: a free-recall test, a 
cued-recall test, or a recognition test that involved deciding whether a statement had 
occurred in the passage.  After a two-day delay, participants took a final free-recall, cued-
recall, or recognition test.  On all final tests, participants who were initially tested with 
free-recall performed better than participants who were initially tested with cued-recall, 
who performed better than participants who were initially tested with a recognition test.  
The greater efficacy of recall tests can be attributed to the fact that they are more likely to 
elicit retrieval than are recognitions tests.  In educational contexts, the differential effects 
of recall and recognition are indicated by studies that have found that short-answer tests 
tend to produce more robust testing effects than do multiple-choice tests (Butler & 
Roediger, 2007; Kang, McDermott, & Roediger, 2007).  
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A third reason to believe that LTM retrieval is the operant mechanism in the 
testing effect is that the size of the testing effect is highly sensitive to manipulations that 
impact retrieval processes.  Manipulations that impact the type, difficulty, or spacing of 
retrieval have all been found to influence the magnitude of the testing effect (Bartlett, 
1977; Bartlett & Tulving, 1974; Gardiner, Craik, & Bleasdale, 1973). 
Although most contemporary accounts posit that retrieval from LTM plays a 
critical role in the testing effect, there are some potentially important differences in how 
different authors frame the role of retrieval.  While some authors have posited that 
retrieval enhances learning by establishing multiple retrieval routes or a mnemonic 
mediator (Bjork, 1975; Pyc & Rawson, 2010), others have appealed to the difficulty or 
depth of retrieval involved in initial practice (Bartlett, 1977; Bjork, 1975; Gardiner et al., 
1973; Jacoby, 1978) to account for the impact of initial retrieval practice on subsequent 
test performance.  In the next chapter, we propose an alternate set of mechanisms that 
generates new predictions for how testing can potentiate future comprehension and 
learning. 
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Chapter 3: Using Testing to Potentiate Future Learning 
Prior research has convincingly demonstrated that testing enhances past learning. 
The novel claim of this dissertation is that testing can also potentiate future learning, 
facilitating the acquisition of new information. This proposal is inspired by studies that 
have demonstrated the key role of prior knowledge in text comprehension (outlined in 
Chapter 1) as well as previous studies of testing that have documented different kinds of 
potentiation, but never of future learning.  
Previous Studies of Test-Potentiation 
 Several previous studies have demonstrated that testing can potentiate learning 
and performance after the initial testing event.  For example, taking a short answer test 
can potentiate future performance on multiple-choice questions that target the same tested 
information (Kang et al., 2007; McDaniel, Anderson, Derbish, & Morrisette, 2007).  The 
most direct antecedents for the current research are the handful of studies that have 
demonstrated that testing can potentiate the learning of previously encountered 
information that has been tested, but not successfully produced (Congleton & Rajaram, 
2011; Izawa, 1966, 1967).   
Potentiating learning of previously encountered information. A small number 
of studies have demonstrated that testing can potentiate the learning of previously 
encountered ideas upon re-exposure (Congleton & Rajaram, 2011; Izawa 1966, 1967). 
Izawa (1967) found that the occurrence of test trials increased the effectiveness of 
subsequent presentation (study) trials of previously encountered information.  In this 
study, participants learned paired associates under four conditions that included the same 
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number of study trials (A-B) but different numbers of test trials (A-).  One of these 
conditions involved twice as many test trials as the others.  Although this condition 
initially showed the slowest learning, after a few trials, this condition produced faster 
learning than the other three conditions and eventually produced the lowest number of 
errors.  The increased testing in this condition had potentiated participants learning from 
re-presentations of previously encountered pairs. 
A more recent study that utilized a more naturalistic paradigm, collaborative 
recall, found that initial testing increased the amount of information that participants 
subsequently learned from other group members (Congleton & Rajaram, 2011).  During 
the first phase of this study, participants learned word lists on their own.  Next, 
participants either repeatedly restudied the word lists or were repeatedly tested with free 
recall tests.  Later, participants collaborated in triads to produce a group recall.  
Participants who had been repeatedly tested were able to learn more from re-exposure to 
words that their group-members produced but they themselves had not remembered. 
Potentiating transfer across tests. A growing number of studies have 
demonstrated that testing can facilitate the transfer of information learned in the past 
from one kind of test to another (Carpenter & Delosh, 2006; Glover, 1989; Kang et al., 
2007; McDaniel et al., 2007; Rohrer, Taylor, & Sholar, 2010).   For example, initial 
short-answer testing can improve subsequent performance on related multiple-choice 
questions (Kang et al., 2007; McDaniel et al., 2007) and initial testing with factual 
questions can improve subsequent performance on inferential questions (Butler, 2010; 
Johnson & Mayer, 2009).  This is a powerful finding given that transfer is typically 
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reduced when encoding tasks and retrieval tasks differ (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 
1977; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987).  
A related finding is that testing promotes transfer from old problem contexts to 
new problem contexts.  Butler (2010) showed that participants who were initially tested 
with questions like “A bat has a very different wing structure from a bird.  What is the 
wing structure of a bat like relative to that of a bird?” were able to successfully transfer 
the knowledge built by answering these test questions to new questions like “The U.S. 
Military is looking at bat wings for inspiration in developing a new type of aircraft.  How 
would this new type of aircraft differ from traditional aircraft like fighter jets?”  Results 
like these demonstrate that the benefits of initial testing are not limited to enhancing 
subsequent performance on the same types of tests that were used to promote learning; 
they show that testing can in fact promote the future application of old information to 
new problems.  The model of test-potentiated learning proposed here claims that testing 
can also promote the future learning of new information. 
Mechanisms for Test-Potentiated Learning 
We propose that testing builds a generative knowledge base that enables people to 
learn more from new, related materials encountered after testing.  For example, if a 
person reads an introductory text about a topic and is then tested on it, she will learn more 
from subsequent texts that build upon and complement the ideas in the introductory text 
than if she had simply restudied the introductory text.  Generative knowledge bases are 
characterized by two defining features: (1) They support the fluent retrieval of 
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information learned in the past in the service of future learning, and (2) this retrieval is 
driven by similarity, resulting in automatic and effortless access.   
Fluency.  We propose that testing potentiates future learning by establishing 
knowledge which can be fluently retrieved in the future.  This proposal is based on results 
that have demonstrated that testing can increase the speed with which tested information 
is retrieved in the future (Allen et al., 1969; Eimas & Zeaman, 1963; Izawa, 1966).  
These faster responses reflect an increase in the subsequent accessibility of tested 
information.  This accessibility is particularly important when learning from texts, 
because text comprehension places high demands on processing resources. 
Similarity.  Testing increases the fluency with which prior knowledge is retrieved 
from LTM by establishing memory traces that are evoked automatically and effortlessly 
on the basis of similarity.  This proposal is based on empirical results from the study of 
discourse comprehension that have shown that new texts automatically evoke featurally 
similar memory traces from LTM (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Cook et al., 1998; Myers 
& O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien, Rizzella, Albrecht, & Halleran, 1998).  During online 
comprehension, the propositions of an incoming text are encoded in WM, and these 
propositions continuously elicit retrieval of potentially relevant traces from LTM 
(McKoon, Gerrig, & Greene, 1996; Myers & O’Brien, 1998).  Traces are retrieved on the 
basis of their semantic, lexical, or phonological similarity to the contents of working 
memory (e.g., Cook, Halleran, & O’Brien, 1998; Lea, Rapp, Elfenbein, Mitchel, & 
Romine, 2008). Once retrieved, this information can be integrated into the reader’s 
emergent representation, facilitating comprehension.  We propose that testing establishes 
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memory traces that are richer in their featural content than the memory traces 
established by restudy. This increases their potential similarity (i.e., featural overlap) with 
new textual propositions in WM, amplifying the probability and speed of their retrieval 
and facilitating their integration into emergent representations. 
Potentiating Learning from Expository Texts 
The generative knowledge bases built by testing promote future comprehension 
and learning from expository texts in two key ways.  First, they enable the fluent 
integration of tested information into new text representations by establishing featurally-
rich memory traces that are subsequently evoked via automatic similarity-based retrieval 
processes.  Second, they promote conceptual changes through the interaction of this 
highly accessible information with new ideas from refutational texts that negate and/or 
qualify originally tested ideas.    
Promoting the fluent integration of relevant knowledge.  As readers proceed 
through a text, they construct an emergent representation of its meaning by integrating 
information from LTM with incoming information from the text (Kintsch, 1988, 1998).  
Testing improves comprehension and learning by increasing the fluency with which 
relevant prior knowledge can be subsequently accessed, thereby increasing readers’ 
integration of tested information into their emergent representations (see Figure 3.1).  
Testing increases the fluency of this access by establishing featurally-rich memory traces 
that are subsequently evoked by similar texts that expand upon, qualify, and even refute 
tested knowledge.  Because similarity-based retrieval processes are automatic and place 
no demands on WM resources, tested ideas are rendered highly accessible during 
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comprehension without taxing readers’ limited processing resources.  High 
accessibility is important because prior knowledge that is not readily available during 
online comprehension is unlikely to be integrated into a reader’s emergent representation 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992).   
 
             
Figure 3.1. Test-potentiated learning from expository texts. (a) Testing builds generative 
knowledge bases composed of featurally-rich memory traces (b) When tested readers 
read a new text, they fluently retrieve information from these generative knowledge 
bases, allowing them to integrate this information into their emergent text 
representations, improving comprehension and learning. 
 
Preparing readers to revise misconceptions.  Another way that testing 
potentiates learning from expository texts is by preparing readers to revise inaccurate 
knowledge and erroneous beliefs.  Testing does this by maximizing the coactivation of 
conflicting tested and new information, promoting cognitive conflict and conceptual 
change.  In some cases this sets up an apparent paradox: Testing can both strengthen an 
inaccurate idea and enable its revision.  For example, initial testing may first strengthen a 
misconception by establishing a memory trace that a reader is even more likely to access 
in the future.  In this case, testing has actually strengthened the misconception.  However, 
if a tested reader subsequently reads a text that explicitly refutes and qualifies this 
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misconception, its greater accessibility increases the probability that the misconception 
will be accessed, evaluated, and rejected. This prediction is particularly important given 
the need to forestall scientific misconceptions and to improve scientific literacy more 
generally. 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 replicated and extended the testing effect with rich, naturalistic 
materials –  expository texts on topics from psychological science.  Because the benefits 
of testing are not usually apparent when final assessments of learning are administered on 
the same day as testing (Thompson et al., 1978), this experiment took place over two 
sessions separated by one week.  On Day 1, participants read two expository texts. One 
text introduced commonly made claims about the validity and utility of learning styles 
approaches to education, and the other introduced commonly made claims about the 
efficacy of using discovery learning in math and science education.  Participants were 
tested on one text and restudied the other for an equivalent amount of time.  On Day 8, 
participants were tested on both texts.  We predicted that participants would recall a 
higher proportion of ideas from the tested text than the restudied text.  Corroboration of 
this prediction is necessary to set the stage for the investigations of test-potentiated 
learning in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Method 
Participants.  Thirty-two participants (M age = 19.05 years, 21 female) at a large 
American university participated for course extra credit or a $15 gift card.  All 
participants were native speakers of English.  Participants were tested in groups or 
individually. 
Design.  A within-participants design was employed in which the sole factor was 
the Day 1 Learning Condition (Test, Restudy).  In the Test condition, participants read a 
text for four minutes, completed math problems for two minutes, and then completed a 
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free recall of the text for four minutes.  The purpose of the math problems was to 
reduce readers’ access to the surface form of the text and to increase participants’ reliance 
on LTM retrieval during the recall task.  A recall test was chosen because it emphasizes 
retrieval from LTM, which is thought to be the primary cognitive mechanism that drives 
test-enhanced learning (Carrier & Pashler, 1992), and because recall tests produce larger 
testing effects than other types of tests (Glover, 1989). In the Restudy condition, 
participants read a different text for four minutes, completed math problems for two 
minutes and then were asked to reread the text for four additional minutes.   
One week later (Day 8), participants were tested on both texts to assess whether 
initial testing or restudy had resulted in greater learning.  The primary dependent variable 
was the proportion of idea units that participants recalled from the Day 1 texts. We also 
collected responses to Likert-type items measuring familiarity with and belief in learning 
styles and discovery learning as well as their interest in the experimental texts. 
 Materials.  Two texts were constructed to approximate the passages that 
participants might encounter in the popular psychology literature (see Appendix A for 
texts).  One argued in favor of using “learning styles” to improve education, and included 
ideas like “learning is best when instruction matches a student’s style.”  This Pro 
Learning Styles text was 393 words long and contained 39 idea units. The other text 
argued in favor of using “discovery learning” to help students in math and science 
education, and conveyed ideas like “when students are allowed to discover scientific 
principles, they are conducting experiments just like a real scientist.” The Pro Discovery 
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Learning text was 407 words long and contained 39 idea units. These texts were 
constructed from popular trade books, online sources, and news articles. 
 Procedure. On Day 1, participants first completed an informed consent process.  
They were then given a packet and informed that they would read two texts, complete 
math problems, restudy one of the texts, and recall as much as they could of the other 
text.  Participants were also informed that they would be tested on both texts the 
following week.  In greater detail, the experimental packets were divided into seven 
sections.  Each section had a fixed amount of time allotted to it, and participants were 
informed when to start and stop working on each section.  In the first section, participants 
read one of the two texts for four minutes.  If they reached the end of the text before time 
elapsed, then they were instructed to reread the text until it was time to move on; this 
served to equate time on task in the Test and Restudy conditions.  In the second section, 
participants completed simple math problems for two minutes. In the third section, 
participants either restudied the text they had read in the first section or recalled as much 
of the text as they could.  Participants were encouraged to recall as much as they could 
even if they could only recall the gist of an idea, and were told not to worry about 
spelling or punctuation.  The third section lasted four minutes.  The fourth section 
comprised two more minutes of math problems.  Over the fifth, sixth, and seventh 
sections, participants read the other text for four minutes, completed math problems for 
two minutes, and either recalled the second text (if they had restudied the first text) or 
restudied the second text (if they had recalled the first text) for four minutes.  The order 
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of text presentation and recall versus restudy were counterbalanced across participants. 
Finally, participants were reminded to return one week later and were excused. 
One week later (Day 8), participants returned to complete the experiment.  They 
were informed that they would be recalling the texts they read the week before and 
completing more math problems.  They were then given a new packet divided into five 
sections. In the first section, participants recalled as much as they could from either the 
“text you read about Discovery Learning” or the “text you read about Learning Styles” 
for five minutes.  In the second section, participants completed short math problems for 
two minutes.  In the third section, participants recalled as much as they could from the 
text they did not recall in the first section, again for five minutes.  In the fourth section, 
participants completed two additional minutes of math problems.  The fifth section 
 
Table 4.1. Likert-Type Items Used to Measure Belief, Interest, and Prior Knowledge. 
Domain Learning Styles Discovery Learning 
Belief that practice is effective I believe that instruction is 
most effective when it is 
provided in a mode that 
matches a learner’s style. 
I believe that people learn 
most when they get to 
discover concepts. 
Interest in text I found the text on Learning 
Styles interesting. 
I found the text on 
Discovery Learning 
interesting. 
Prior-knowledge about topic  I already knew a lot about 
Learning Styles. 
I already knew a lot about 
Discovery Learning. 
 
Note: Response options ranged from “1-Strongly Disagree “ to “7-Strongly Agree “. 
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contained Likert-type items measuring their familiarity with and belief in learning 
styles and discovery learning as well as their interest in the texts (see Table 4.1). The 
order of text recall was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results 
 The primary research question for Experiment 1 was whether, on Day 8, 
participants would recall a higher proportion of ideas from the text they had been tested 
on a week before than from the text they had restudied.  To assess this, each participant’s 
recalls were parsed into idea units and coded by the first author and a research assistant 
who was blind to the research question.  Throughout coding, experimental condition was 
masked.  Reliability was high (Cohen’s kappa = .95 on 528 in common idea units) and 
disagreements were resolved through discussion.   
Free recalls.  Figure 4.1 displays the mean proportion of idea units recalled on 
Day 8 as a function of Day 1 learning condition.  Participants recalled a higher proportion 
(paired-t(31) = 2.88, p = 0.007, Cohen’s d = .62) of the idea units from the tested text (M 
= .18, SE = .02) than from the restudied text (M = .13, SE = .01).  Post-hoc comparisons 
showed that these learning increases held for both texts.  Participants who were tested on 
the learning styles text recalled marginally more ideas (M = .21, SE = .02)  from the text 
than participants who restudied it (M = .16 , SE = .02) (t(30) = 1.85 , p = 0.07), and 
participants who were tested on the discovery learning text also recalled marginally more 
ideas (M = .14, SE = .02) from that text than participants who restudied it (M = .11, SE = 
.01) (t(30) = 1.78 , p = 0.08).   
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Figure 4.1. Proportion of idea units recalled on Day 8 as a function of Day 1 learning 
condition; error bars represent standard errors. Results reveal a testing effect, with D1 
ideas better recalled if information was initially tested versus restudied.  
 
Belief, interest, and prior knowledge ratings.  To investigate whether Day 1 
testing influenced the strength of self-reported beliefs, we compared the strength of 
participants’ belief in the practice they were tested on to the strength of their belief in the 
practice they had restudied (see Table 4.2).  To account for differences in the average 
strength of belief in the efficacy of discovery learning and learning styles, we first 
normalized responses by mean-centering responses to each statement6. Participants did 
not report stronger beliefs in either Tested or Restudied topics (paired-t(30) = .007, p = 
.99) Note that one participant did not complete the Likert-type items.  Parallel analyses 
revealed that participants did not report significantly different levels of interest  (paired-
t(30) = .16, p = .87) or prior knowledge (paired-t(30) = .25, p = .80) in Tested or 
Restudied topics.    
                                                
6 Responses were mean-centered using data from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
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Table 4.2.  Mean (SE) Belief, Interest, and Prior Knowledge Ratings for Tested and 
Restudied Topics. 
Domain Tested Restudied 
Belief that practice is effective .50 (.27) .49 (.26) 
Interested in text -.09 (.25) -.18 (.25) 
Prior-knowledge about topic  -.24 (.22) -.18 (.23) 
Note: Responses were mean-centered for each statement to account for differences 
in agreement rates between statements.  Mean-centering was performed on data 
from both Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Mean (SE) Belief, Interest, and Prior Knowledge Ratings Disaggregated by 
Text. 
 
 
Domain 
 
 
Statement 
Tested on 
Discovery 
Learning 
Tested on 
Learning  
Styles 
 
 
t(29) 
 
 
p 
Belief that 
practice is 
effective 
I believe that people learn most 
when they get to discover 
concepts. 
4.75 (.48) 
 
4.60 (.39) 
 
.24 .81 
 I believe that instruction is 
most effective when it is 
provided in a mode that 
matches a learner’s style.  
5.75 (.36) 
 
5.60 (.25) 
 
.34 .75 
Interest in 
text 
I found the text on Discovery 
Learning interesting. 
5.13 (.27) 
 
4.80 (.39) 
 
.69 .50 
 I found the text on Learning 
Styles interesting. 
5.19 (.25) 
 
4.73 (.34) 
 
1.08 .29 
Prior-
knowledge 
about topic 
I already knew a lot about 
Discovery Learning. 
4.25 (.37) 
 
4.20 (.35) 
 
.10 .92 
 I already knew a lot about 
Learning Styles. 
 
4.69 (.35) 
 
4.80 (.35) 
 
.23 .82 
 
Note: Response options ranged from “1-Strongly Disagree “ to “7-Strongly Agree “. 
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Additional post-hoc comparisons (see Table 4.3) confirmed that testing did not influence 
self-reports of belief in a practice’s efficacy, interest in the texts, or prior knowledge for 
either topic. 
The disaggregated belief ratings presented in Table 4.3 illustrate two important 
points.  First, participants believe strongly that these educational practices are effective.  
Second, participants believed more strongly in the efficacy of learning styles (M = 5.68, 
SE = .22) than discovery learning (M = 4.68, SE = .31) (paired-t(30) = 2.78, p < .01, 
Cohen’s d = .68)  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated a testing effect for naturalistic expository texts on 
topics in psychological science.  Participants recalled a significantly higher proportion of 
idea units from the text they had been tested on one week earlier than from the text they 
had restudied.  This complements a large number of demonstrations that testing can 
enhance the learning of previously encountered stimuli like word lists and paired 
associates (e.g., Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Hogan & Kintsch, 1971) as well as a growing 
body of research showing that testing can enhance the learning of previously encountered 
information from expository texts (e.g., Glover, 1989; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  
Experiment 1 also demonstrated that participants believed strongly in the efficacy of 
popular educational theories, especially learning styles, and that testing had no effect on 
these beliefs.  These results set the stage for Experiment 2, which investigates whether 
testing produces a generative knowledge base that potentiates learning from new 
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materials encountered in the future, even when these ideas conflict with strongly held 
beliefs. 
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Chapter 5: Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 investigated whether the benefits of testing transfer to new learning 
experiences: in this case, comprehending and learning from a new text which qualified, 
negated, and elaborated initially tested ideas.  Based on the proposal that testing 
potentiates future learning by establishing a generative knowledge base that increases the 
fluency and automaticity with which information is subsequently retrieved from LTM, 
we predicted that testing would facilitate participants’ comprehension and learning from 
these new texts.  Because highly accessible ideas come into conflict with new textual 
ideas that explicitly negated and qualified them, we also predicted that testing would 
facilitate conceptual change.  
The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as the procedure for Experiment 1 
on Day 1:  Participants read the Pro Learning Styles and Pro Discovery Learning texts 
and were tested on one and restudied the other.  The procedure differed on Day 8:  
Participants read two new refutational texts that elaborated, qualified, and negated the 
information in the Day 1 texts.  Participants were then tested on these new texts to assess 
whether being tested on versus restudying the Day 1 texts potentiated the learning of new 
information from the Day 8 texts.  The major prediction was that participants would 
recall a higher proportion of ideas that occurred in the new text that was related to the 
Day 1 text they had been tested on than ideas that occurred in the new text that was 
related to the Day 1 text they had restudied. Critically, this advantage should even be 
present for new ideas that negate or qualify ideas in the old texts, signaling conceptual 
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change. We also predicted that testing might attenuate participants’ beliefs in the 
efficacy of learning styles and discovery learning. 
Method  
 Participants.  Twenty-four participants (M age = 20.23 years, 20 female) at a 
large American university participated for course extra-credit or a $15 gift card.  All were 
native speakers of English. 
Design.  As in Experiment 1, a within-participants design was employed in which 
the sole factor was the Day 1 Learning Condition (Test, Restudy).  The key difference 
was in the dependent measures. On Day 8, participants read two new texts, one related to 
the text on which they had been tested on Day 1 and the other to the text they had 
restudied on Day 1.  The new texts contained different types of ideas: D1D8 idea units 
occurred in both the Day 1 and Day 8 texts, whereas D8 idea units were only present in 
the D8 text.  D8 idea units were further divided into two subtypes. Refutational D8 idea 
units built upon previously encountered D1D8 idea units by explicitly negating or 
qualifying them. For example, the D8 idea unit “Discovery learning is not a new idea” 
explicitly negates the D1D8 idea unit “Discovery learning is a new idea”. By contrast, 
elaborative D8 idea units introduced new content unrelated to D1D8 idea units. For 
example, the D8 idea unit “the brain learns through multiple senses working together” 
does not explicitly build upon any of the D1D8 idea units in the Day 1 Pro Learning 
Styles text. After reading each new text, participants completed a recall measure on that 
text.  The major dependent variables were the proportion of D1D8 and D8 idea units that 
participants recalled from the new texts. We also measured their familiarity with and 
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belief in learning styles and discovery learning after reading the refutational texts on 
Day 8 using the Likert-type items used in Experiment 1. 
 Materials.  On Day 1, participants read the same Pro Learning Styles and Pro 
Discovery Learning texts used in Experiment 1.  On Day 8, participants read two new 
texts that refuted the Day 1 texts.  The Anti Learning Styles text introduced scientific 
criticisms of the validity and utility of learning styles approaches to education. The Anti 
Discovery Learning text presented scientific criticisms of the effectiveness of pure 
discovery learning in math and science education.  The content of these refutational texts 
was inspired by influential review articles from the psychological literature (Mayer, 
2004; Pashler et al., 2008).     
 To understand the relations between the original Day 1 texts and the new Day 8 
texts, consider the following excerpt from the Pro Learning Styles text read on Day 1: 
It is clear that people think and learn in different ways.  Like most people, you 
have probably had a teacher who just did not work for you.  This was probably 
due to the fact that the teacher’s instructional style did not match your learning 
style.  More and more educators are recognizing that some people learn visually, 
others learn verbally, and still others learn kinesthetically.  Participants learn best 
when instruction matches their particular style.  For example, a visual learner 
learns best with visual instruction and a verbal learner learns best with verbal 
instruction.   
 43 
This text makes a number of widely held, but empirically unsubstantiated claims. Next, 
consider an excerpt from the Anti Learning Styles text read on Day 8, which questions 
many of these claims: 
The idea that people learn in different ways has grown in popularity in recent 
years.  Most learning styles theories claim that some people learn verbally and 
others learn visually.  The appeal of these theories is often based on anecdotal 
evidence like most people’s experience that some teacher just did not work for 
them.  Unfortunately, there is no strong evidence that learning is best when 
instructional format matches a student’s putative style. 
This text contains a combination of previously encountered D1D8 ideas and new D8 
ideas.  For example, “learning is best when instruction matches a student’s style” is a 
D1D8 idea, whereas “there is no strong evidence that learning is best when instruction 
matches a student’s style” is a refutational D8 idea.  (See Table 5.1 for additional 
examples.)  The Anti Learning Style text was 522 words long and contained 22 
previously encountered D1D8 idea units and 43 new D8 idea units. The Anti Discovery 
Learning text was 531 words long and contained 19 D1D8 idea units and 47 D8 idea 
units. 
Procedure. Experiment 2 took place over two sessions separated by one week.  
The Day 1 procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. When participants returned on 
Day 8, they were informed that they would read two new texts on educational issues, 
complete more math problems, and recall as much as they could from the new texts.  
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Table 5.1. Example D1D8 Idea Units (Idea Units Present in Both Texts) and D8 Idea 
Units (Idea Units Present Only in the Day 8 Text).   
 
Text Pair D1D8 idea unit D8 idea unit Day 1 Text Source  Day 8 Text Source  
Learning 
Styles 
Students are 
happier when 
instruction 
matches style 
 
Although 
students are 
happier when 
instruction 
matches 
preferred style, 
they do not learn 
more. 
Refutational 
 
Additionally, when 
students receive 
instruction that 
matches their style, 
they are much 
happier and more 
engaged in the 
lesson. 
Although students 
are definitely 
happier when they 
receive instruction 
that matches their 
preferred style, 
they do not appear 
to learn more.   
Learning 
Styles 
NA Massa and Mayer 
conducted a 
study in 2006. 
Elaborative 
 
NA For example, 
consider a study by 
Massa and Mayer 
(2006).   
Discovery 
Learning 
Students who 
learn through 
discovery are 
better able to 
apply concepts to 
new problems in 
the future.  
 
There is no 
evidence that 
students who 
learn through 
discovery are 
better able to 
apply concepts to 
new problems in 
the future.  
Refutational 
 
Because they have 
already 
encountered 
significant hurdles 
during learning, 
students who learn 
through discovery 
are better able to 
apply previously 
learned concepts 
to new problems in 
the future. 
In addition to not 
promoting initial 
learning, there is 
no strong evidence 
that discovery 
learning improves 
students’ ability to 
apply learned 
concepts to new 
problems.   
Discovery 
Learning 
NA Background 
knowledge can 
reduce the 
demands that 
discovery places 
on cognitive 
resources. 
Elaborative 
NA Background 
knowledge and 
prior experience 
can reduce the 
demands that 
discovery learning 
places on cognitive 
resources. 
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They were then given an experimental packet divided into eight sections. In the first 
section, participants read one of the two new refutational texts for six minutes. In the 
second section, participants completed simple math problems for two minutes. In the 
third section, participants recalled as much of the text they read in the first section as they 
could for seven minutes.  The fourth section comprised two more minutes of math 
problems.  During the fifth section, participants read the other new refutational text for 
six minutes, and during the sixth section they solved math problems for two minutes.  In 
the seventh section, participants recalled as much as they could from the text they read in 
the fifth section for seven minutes. The final section contained Likert-type items 
measuring familiarity with and belief in learning styles and discovery learning as well as 
interest in the texts.  The order of text presentation on Day 8 was counterbalanced across 
participants.   
Results 
 The major research question for Experiment 2 was whether participants would 
learn a higher proportion of ideas from a new text that refuted an old text if they had been 
tested on the old text a week earlier as opposed to having restudied it.  To assess this, 
participants’ recalls were parsed into D1D8 idea units and D8 idea units (both 
refutational and elaborative) and coded by the first author and a research assistant who 
was blind to the research questions.  Reliability was high (Cohen’s kappa = .92 on 744 in 
common idea units) and disagreements were resolved through discussion.  
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Free recalls.  Figure 5.1a displays the mean proportion of D1D8 and D8 idea 
units recalled from the new texts read on Day 8 as a function of the learning condition for 
the related Day 1 texts. Participants recalled a higher proportion (paired-t(23) = 2.73, p = 
.01, Cohen’s d = .55) of the D1D8 ideas common to the old and new texts if they had 
been tested on the old text (M = .25, SE = .03) than if they had restudied it (M = .19 SE = 
.02). This replicates the testing effect documented in Experiment 1.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Proportion of idea units recalled on Day 8 as a function of  
Day 1 learning condition for the related text; error bars represent standard errors.  a) 
Experiment 2 replicated the testing effect observed in Experiment 1 for D1D8 ideas; with 
D1D8 ideas better recalled if information was initially tested versus restudied.  Critically, 
Experiment 2 also revealed a new potentiated learning effect, with new D8 ideas better 
recalled if Day 1 texts were tested versus restudied, presumably due to the generative 
knowledge base established by testing on Day 1. b) Test potentiated learning was 
reflected by better recall of new D8 ideas that refuted/qualified D1D8 ideas and 
marginally better recall of new ideas that elaborated previous ideas without explicitly 
building on them. 
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Critically, participants recalled a higher proportion (paired-t(23) = 3.30, p = 
.003, Cohen’s d = .81) of the new D8 ideas if they had been tested on the related Day 1 
text (M = .21, SE = .01) than if they had restudied it (M = .16, SE = .02).  This 
demonstrates that initial testing potentiated the learning of new information.  Next, we 
separately analyzed the two classes of D8 idea units (see Figure 5.1b). Participants 
recalled a higher proportion (paired-t(23) = 2.52, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .54) of refutational 
D8 idea units, which qualified and negated D1D8 idea units, if they had been tested on 
the old text (M = .18, SE = .02) than if they had restudied it (M = .13 SE = .02). This was 
also true for elaborative D8 idea units, which introduced new content, but the effect was 
only marginal: Participants recalled a marginally higher proportion (paired-t(23) = 1.90 , 
p = .07) of elaborative D8 idea units if they had tested on the old text (M = .24, SE = .02) 
than if they had restudied it (M = .20 SE = .02).  
Post-hoc comparisons showed that these learning increases were significant only 
for the discovery learning texts (see Table 5.2). Participants who were tested on the Day 
1 Pro Discovery Learning text recalled more D1D8 ideas, as well as more D8 ideas units 
(including refutational but not elaborative ideas), from the Day 8 Anti Discovery 
Learning text than participants who had restudied the first text.  Participants who were 
tested on the Day 1 Pro Learning Styles text did not recall significantly more of any of 
these idea types from the new Anti Learning Styles text than did participants who had 
restudied the first text.  One reason for this discrepancy may be the greater strength of 
participants’ belief in the efficacy of Learning Styles practices identified in Experiment 1. 
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Table 5.2. Mean (SE) Proportional Recall Disaggregated by Text 
 Discovery Learning   Learning Styles   
 Restudy Test t(22) p Restudied Tested t(22) p 
D1D8 .13 (.02) 
 
.29 (.04) 
 
3.63, 
 
<.01 .26 (.02) 
 
.22 (.03) 
 
.98 
 
.34 
D8 .15 (.02) 
 
.22 (.02) 
 
2.13 
 
.04 .18 (.03) 
 
.20 (.02) 
 
.72 
 
.48 
D8 
Refutational 
 
.12 (.02) 
 
.22 (.04) 
 
2.56 
 
.02 .15 (.03) 
 
.16 (.02) 
 
.15 
 
.88 
D8 
Elaborative  
.19 (.03) 
 
.22 (.02) 
 
1.02 
 
.32 .22 (.03) 
 
.26 (.03) 
 
.90 
 
.37 
 
Belief, interest, and prior knowledge ratings.  We next evaluated whether 
testing, reading a refutational text, or the interaction of these two experiences affected 
beliefs about learning styles and discovery learning.  To do this, we analyzed 
participants’ beliefs about these practices gathered at the end of both Experiments 1 and 
2.  Recall that participants in Experiment 1 only read texts that reinforced commonly held 
beliefs about learning styles and discovery learning. By contrast, participants in 
Experiment 2 also read texts refuting these commonly held beliefs.  Table 5.3 presents 
participants’ mean levels of belief in the efficacy of the tested and restudied topics in 
Experiments 1 and 2. To account for differences in mean rates of agreement for different 
statements, responses were mean-centered by statement.   
To analyze this belief data, we performed a mixed model Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with Day 1 Learning Condition (Test, Restudy) as a within subjects factor and 
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Experiment (E1, E2) as a between subjects factor.  Note that one participant in 
Experiment 1 did not respond to these items.  For the belief that an approach is effective, 
the main effect of Experiment was significant (F (1,53) = 15.61, MSE  = 34.90,  p  < 
.001), but the main effect of Learning Condition was not (F (1,53) = .11, MSE = .21 p = 
.74).  The Experiment x Learning Condition interaction was also not significant  (F (1,53) 
= .15, MSE = .30, p = .69).  The main effect of Experiment shows that reading 
refutational texts attenuated beliefs in the efficacy of learning styles and discovery 
learning.   The absence of an interaction between Learning Condition and Experiment 
fails to support the prediction that testing can amplify the belief change caused by reading 
a refutational text.   
 
 
Table 5.3. Mean (SE) Belief, Interest, and Prior Knowledge Ratings for Tested and 
Restudied Topics by Experiment. 
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 Tested Restudied Tested Restudied 
Belief that approach is effective .50 (.27) .49 (.26) -.74 (.27) -.54 (.31) 
Interested in text(s)* -.09 (.25) -.18 (.25) .09 (.27) .26 (.26) 
Prior-knowledge about topic  -.24 (.22) -.18 (.23) .11 (.27) .44 (.22) 
 
Note: Responses were mean-centered for each statement to account for differences in agreement rates 
between statements.   
 
* Statements read “text” in Experiment 1 and “texts” in Experiment 2. 
  
 50 
We also conducted ANOVAs on responses that measured interest in the text(s) 
as well as prior knowledge about these two practices. For self-reported interest, there was 
a marginal main effect of Experiment, with participants who had read the additional 
refutational texts reporting higher levels of interest (F (1,53) = 2.98, MSE = 6.51, p  =  
.09).  Neither the main effect of Learning Condition (F (1,53) = 1.06, MSE = .88, p = 
.31), nor the interaction (F (1,53) = .61, MSE = .51, p = .44) were significant.  For self-
reported prior knowledge, neither main effect was significant, nor was the interaction (all 
Fs < 1.05). 
Additional post-hoc comparisons (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5) showed that 
participants in Experiment 2 reported lower levels of agreement with both the statement 
“I believe that instruction is most effective when it is provided in a mode that matches a 
learner’s style” and the statement “I believe that people learn most when they get to 
discovery concepts” than did participants in Experiment 1.  This suggests that reading a 
refutational text drove changes in beliefs about both of these educational practices.  Post-
hoc comparisons also showed that the higher levels of interest associated with reading a 
refutational text were significant only for the statement that asked readers about the 
learning styles text(s).  
The only evidence that is congruent with the prediction that testing can amplify 
the belief change caused by refutational texts comes from the marginally lower rates of 
endorsement for the statement “I believe that people learn most when they get to 
discovery concepts” provided by participants who were tested on the Pro Discovery 
Learning text in Experiment 2 (see Table 5.5). 
 51 
Table 5.4. Mean (SE) Belief, Interest, and Prior Knowledge Ratings Disaggregated by 
Topic for Experiments 1 and 2. 
  Exp 1 Exp 2 t(53) p 
Belief that 
practice is 
effective 
I believe that people learn 
most when they get to 
discover concepts. 
4.68 (.31) 3.44 (0.27) 2.94 <.01 
 I believe that instruction is 
most effective when it is 
provided in a mode that 
matches a learner’s style.  
5.68 (.22) 4.65 (0.31) 2.80 <.01 
Interested 
in text(s) 
I found the text(s) on 
Discovery Learning 
interesting.* 
4.97 (.23) 5.29 (0.28) .89 .37 
 I found the text(s) on 
Learning Styles 
interesting.* 
4.97 (.21) 5.62 (0.22) 
 
2.16 .04 
Prior-
knowledge 
about 
topic 
I already knew a lot about 
Discovery Learning. 
4.23 (.25) 4.21 (0.32) .04 .97 
 I already knew a lot about 
Learning Styles. 
 
4.74 (.25) 5.38 (0.21) 1.90 .06 
 
Note: Response options ranged from “1-Strongly Disagree “ to “7-Strongly Agree “. 
 
* Statements read “text” in Experiment 1 and “texts” in Experiment 2. 
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Table 5.5. Mean (SE) Belief, Interest, and Prior Knowledge Ratings Disaggregated by 
Text for Experiment 2. 
  Tested on 
Discovery 
Learning 
Tested on 
Learning  
Styles 
 
 
t(22) 
 
 
p 
Belief that 
practice is 
effective 
I believe that people learn 
most when they get to 
discover concepts. 
3.00 (.43) 
 
3.89 (.30) 
 
1.67 .11 
 I believe that instruction is 
most effective when it is 
provided in a mode that 
matches a learner’s style.  
4.42 (.54) 
 
4.89 (.30) 
 
.74 .47 
Interested 
in text(s) 
I found the text(s) on 
Discovery Learning 
interesting.* 
5.17 (.49) 
 
5.42 (.29) 
 
.44 .66 
 I found the text(s) on 
Learning Styles 
interesting.* 
5.83 (.34) 
 
5.42 (.26) 
 
.97 .34 
Prior-
knowledge 
about 
topic 
I already knew a lot about 
Discovery Learning. 
3.75 (.46) 
 
4.67 (.41) 
 
1.48 .15 
 I already knew a lot about 
Learning Styles. 
 
5.08 (.33) 
 
5.67 (.22) 
 
1.44 .16 
 
Note: Response options ranged from “1-Strongly Disagree “ to “7-Strongly Agree “. 
 
* Statements read “text” in Experiment 1 and “texts” in Experiment 2. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the testing effect documented in Experiment 1.  
Participants recalled a significantly higher proportion of previously encountered (D1D8) 
ideas from the old text they had been tested on one week earlier than from the text they 
had restudied. 
The novel finding of Experiment 2 was that testing potentiated the future learning 
of new information. When participants were tested on an old text and, one week later, 
read a new text that refuted and elaborated some of the old text’s claims, they recalled a 
significantly higher proportion of new (D8) ideas than when the old text was simply 
restudied. This finding extends previous demonstrations of the benefits of testing. It 
demonstrates that testing can potentiate the learning of new ideas encountered after initial 
testing, in addition to potentiating the learning of previously encountered ideas that are 
re-presented after initial testing (Congleton & Rajaram, 2011; Izawa, 1966, 1967) and the 
transfer of previously learned ideas to new tests (Butler, 2010; Carpenter & Delosh, 
2006; Glover, 1989; Kang et al., 2007; McDaniel et al., 2007). 
These results support the proposal that testing promotes future learning by 
producing a generative knowledge base that can be fluently integrated with new textual 
information.  Importantly, successful comprehension and learning from the texts used in 
this experiment required more than simple integration.  The Day 8 texts presented ideas 
that refuted and qualified the Day 1 texts, requiring a fundamental reorganization of Day 
1 ideas.  Testing may contribute to this conceptual change by promoting the coactivation 
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of previously held ideas and new refutational text via low-level mechanisms like 
fluency and similarity.   
These results also suggest that beliefs may play a key role in determining whether 
testing is effective in promoting conceptual change.  Post-hoc comparisons showed that 
although participants who were tested on the Pro Discovery Learning text subsequently 
learned more from the Anti Discovery Learning text than those who restudied the original 
text, testing on the Pro Learning Styles texts did not promote subsequent learning from 
the Anti Learning Styles text.  This discrepancy may have been due to strong beliefs 
about the efficacy of learning styles that participants brought to the experiment.  These 
strong beliefs may have prevented participants from revising misconceptions about 
learning styles.  We investigate this question more directly in Experiment 3, by 
comparing the effects of testing for participants who strongly believe in learning styles to 
those who are more skeptical of the practice’s efficacy.  
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Chapter 6: Experiment 3 
The primary goals of Experiment 3 were to investigate whether testing can 
potentiate comprehension and learning in the context of two educationally relevant tasks 
and to investigate whether prior beliefs in a topic modulate test-potentiated learning.  
Although the results of the first two experiments demonstrated that testing can both 
enhance the knowledge that readers build and potentiate their future learning of new 
ideas, these learning gains were demonstrated using free-recall tasks.  Free recall is a 
convenient tool for psychological research, but it is not directly relevant to educational 
practice.  As a first step in demonstrating the potential educational utility of test-
potentiated learning, Experiment 3 investigated whether prior testing could improve 
participants’ performance on critical essays and short answer questions by enhancing 
their past learning and potentiating their future learning and critical comprehension.  
Experiment 3 further investigated how prior beliefs in a topic may modulate test-
potentiated learning. The results of Experiment 2 suggested that test-potentiated learning 
may be most effective when participants do not hold strong, pre-existing beliefs that 
contradict educational materials.  In Experiment 3, we test this assumption more directly, 
by contrasting the effects of testing on materials critical of learning styles practices for 
participants who strongly believe in these practices to those who are more skeptical of 
their efficacy. 
To investigate these questions, we modified the procedure and materials used in 
Experiment 2.  On Day 1, participants read a text that introduced key criticisms of the 
validity and utility of “learning styles”.  Half of the participants were tested on this Anti 
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Learning Styles text, and the other half restudied it for an equivalent amount of time.  
After a week’s delay, all participants read a new Pro Learning Styles text that advocated 
the use of learning styles to improve educational outcomes.  They were then asked to 
write a critical essay about the Pro Learning Styles text, to answer a series of short 
answer questions, and to respond to a series of Likert-type items that were designed to 
capture their beliefs about the utility and validity of learning styles approaches to 
education.  
There were three central predictions for Experiment 3.  Based on previous 
research into test-enhanced learning (including Experiments 1 and 2), we predicted that 
initial testing on the Anti Learning Styles text would increase that amount of information 
that students retained from this text and that this would be reflected in their increased 
inclusion of ideas from the Day 1 text in critical essays and short answer responses on 
Day 8.  Based on the proposed model of test potentiated learning and its preliminary 
validation in Experiment 2, we also predicted that initial testing on the Anti Learning 
Styles text would increase the amount of information that participants learned from the 
Pro Learning Styles text they read a week later and that this increased learning of new 
ideas would be reflected by the increased inclusion of ideas from the new text in critical 
essays.  Finally, based on previous research into the powerful role of misconceptions in 
learning (e.g., Alvermann et al., 1985; Kardash & Scholes, 1996),  we predicted that 
essay performance would be characterized by an interaction between participants’ beliefs 
and learning condition.   Specifically, we predicted that participants who strongly 
endorsed statements in favor of learning styles and who weakly endorsed statements 
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against learning styles would not demonstrate test-enhanced learning of ideas that were 
critical of learning styles in the context of writing a critical essay. On the other hand, 
participants who were more skeptical of learning styles were predicted to demonstrate 
test-enhanced learning of ideas that are critical of the construct and were predicted to 
include more of these critical ideas in their essay responses.  
Method 
Participants.  Forty-two participants (M age = 20.05 years, 22 female) at a large 
American university participated for course extra-credit or a $15 gift card.  The data from 
one participant was excluded from the subsequent analyses due to a failure to follow 
instructions.  All participants were native speakers of English. 
Materials. Two texts were constructed for Experiment 3: one for the Day 1 
session and another for the Day 8 session.  The Day 1 text introduced key scientific and 
economic criticisms of the utility and validity of “learning styles” approaches to 
education.  The Day 8 text presented arguments, both anecdotal and evidence-based, in 
favor of using learning styles to improve educational outcomes.  To understand the 
relation between the Day 8 text and the Day 1 text, consider the following excerpts (see 
Appendix B for the full texts).  First, consider an excerpt from the Day 1 text that 
presented an argument which was critical of learning styles: 
Another reason for the popularity of learning styles is the widely held belief that 
all students should be treated by educators as unique individuals.  However, 
rejecting learning styles approaches to education does not mean rejecting 
individuality.  In fact, it may allow educators to focus on differences between 
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students that are more important to educational outcomes such as differences in 
aptitude or personality. 
Now, consider an excerpt from the Day 8 text that supported using learning styles to 
improve education 
Each student is an individual and deserves an education that recognizes it.  By 
tailoring instruction to each student’s learning style, we can maximize learning 
and ensure that each student receives the individualized education they deserve.   
We need to start assessing each student’s learning style and partitioning our 
classrooms to ensure that each student is taught in the most appropriate way. 
These texts were constructed to contain three types of ideas: D1 ideas that were present 
only in the text read on Day 1, D1D8 ideas that were present in both texts, and D8 ideas 
that were present only in the text read on Day 8.  An example of a D1 idea in the first 
excerpt is “rejecting learning styles does not mean rejecting individuality”.  In the context 
of writing a critical essay or answering the short answer questions posed in this 
experiment, ideas like this allow a participant to qualify, elaborate, or refute the argument 
presented in the new Day 8 text.  D1D8 ideas were contained in both texts.  An example 
of a D1D8 idea unit from the excerpts above is “all students deserve to be treated as 
individuals”.  D8 ideas were only presented by the new text.  An example of a D8 idea 
unit in the second excerpt above is “Learning styles based education is the only way to 
respect students’ individuality”.  In the context of the essay and short answer tasks, D8 
ideas reflect the ideas that participants were expected to refute and qualify.  
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The Day 1 Anti Discovery Learning Styles text was 602 words long and 
contained 42 D1 idea units that were not repeated in the Day 8 Pro Learning Styles text 
as well as 13 D1D8 idea units that were also presented in the Day 8 text.  The Day 8 Pro 
Learning Styles text was 432 words long and contained the 13 D1D8 idea as well as 30 
D8 idea units that were not presented in the Day 1 text. 
Six short answer questions were constructed that were designed to assess the 
quality of the participants’ critical representations of the Day 8 text. An example question 
is “5- What would be the economic consequences of the author’s plan?  Be specific.”   
The short answer questions were designed to primarily elicit information from the Day 1, 
not the Day 8 text.  See Appendix B for the full set of questions.  
Six Likert-type items were also constructed to provide a gauge of each 
participant’s background knowledge, beliefs, and interest in the topic.  Participants were 
asked to rate their agreement with statements like “I already knew a lot about the topics 
covered in the text” on a seven point scale (1-“Strongly Disagree” to 7-“Strongly Agree”) 
(see Table 6.1 on p. 66 for all statements).  Four items (the first four in Table 6.1) were 
designed to reveal the potential impact of learning condition on beliefs about learning 
styles.  For example, lower levels of agreement with statements like “I believe that 
instruction is most effective when it is provided in a mode that matches a learner’s style.” 
by Test participants than by Restudy participants would suggest that testing influenced 
beliefs about learning styles approaches to education.  These four items were also 
designed to support an exploration of the impact of beliefs on essay and short answer 
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performance by allowing participants to be divided into two groups: LS Believers and 
LS Skeptics. 
Procedure.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 took place over two 
sessions separated by one week.  On Day 1, participants first completed an informed 
consent procedure.  After providing informed consent, participants were given an 
experimental packet that contained the Anti Discovery Learning text, several math 
problems, and blank pages for the participants who would be asked to produce a recall of 
the text.  Participants were informed that they would be asked to read the text, to 
complete some math problems, and to either restudy the text or to recall as much as they 
could from it.  Participants were also informed that the text they read in the fist session 
would be important to the second experimental session and were asked to read and study 
it carefully.   
The Day 1 procedure and the accompanying experimental packet were divided 
into three sections.  Each section had a specific amount of time allotted to it, and 
participants were informed by the experimenter when to start and when to finish each 
section.  In the first section, participants read the Anti Learning Styles text for six 
minutes.  In the second section, participants completed simple math problems for two 
minutes.  In the third section, one half of the participants were asked to restudy the text 
for six minutes.  The other half were asked to recall as much as they could from the text 
for an equivalent amount of time.  As in the first two experiments, tested participants 
were encouraged to recall as much as they could even if they could only recall the gist of 
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an idea and were also told not to worry about spelling or punctuation.  At the end of 
the Day 1 session, participants were reminded to return one week later and were excused. 
 One week later (Day 8), participants returned to complete the experiment.  Upon 
returning, participants were informed that they would be asked to read a new text on 
educational issues, to write a critical essay about the new text, and to answer a set of 
short answer questions.  Participants were then given a new packet.  This packet and the 
procedure for Day 8 were divided into four sections.  Unlike the Day 1 session, each 
section was self-paced and participants were free to move on to the next section as soon 
as they completed the current one.  In the first section, participants read the new Pro 
Learning Styles text.  In the second section, participants were asked to write an essay that 
critiqued the text they had just read.  The instructions for this section asked participants to 
point out “as many potential criticisms or important points” as they could “no matter 
what” their “personal beliefs … about Learning Styles” were.  In the third section, 
participants answered the six questions that were designed to elicit a critical evaluation of 
the arguments presented by the text they had just read.  In the fourth and final section, 
participants rated their agreement with the six Likert-type items.  
Coding.  Each participant’s essay and short answer responses were parsed into 
idea units and coded by the first author and a research assistant who was blind to the 
research questions.  Reliability was high (Cohen’s kappa = .88 on 1488 in common idea 
units) and disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
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Results  
To preview the results, participants’ responses to the essay stem and the short 
answer questions confirmed the prediction that testing can be used to enhance past 
learning and to potentiate future learning from expository texts, thereby enabling 
participants to produce richer responses to educationally relevant learning assessment.  
Overall, the responses produced by tested participants contained more ideas from both 
the tested Day 1 text and the new text read on Day 8.  The results of Experiment 3 also 
demonstrated the important role of beliefs in test-potentiated learning.  Participants’ 
inclusion of critical ideas from the Day 1 text was driven not by learning condition alone 
(i.e., testing versus restudy), but by an interaction between their beliefs and learning 
condition.  While tested participants’ who were skeptical of learning styles produced 
more of the critical D1 ideas than did skeptical participants who had simply restudied the 
Day 1 text, tested participants’ who believed strongly in the efficacy and validity of 
learning styles did not produce more of these critical ideas than participants who had 
restudied them. 
Essay responses.  Writing a successful critical essay about the new text required 
participants to state the claims made by the author of the new text and to present 
contradictory or qualifying evidence.  In the context of this text set, the claims made by 
the author of the second text included both new D8 ideas and repeated D1D8 ideas, and 
the critical/ qualifying evidence was represented by the old D1 ideas from the first text.  
When essay responses were considered by themselves (see Figure 6.1), participants who 
were tested on Day 1 failed to integrate a higher proportion of D1 ideas (M = .06, SE = 
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.02) into their critical essays than participants who had restudied the Day 1 text (M = 
.05, SE = .01) (t(39) = .83, p > .05).   However, participants who were tested on Day 1 
did integrate more D1D8 ideas  (M = .15, SE = .02) into their critical essays than did 
participants who had restudied the Day 1 text (M = .08, SE = .02) (t(39) = 2.6, p = .02,  
 
Figure 6.1. Proportion of idea units from the Day 1 text (D1), both texts (D1D8), and the 
Day 8 text (D8) included in essay responses as a function of Day 1 learning condition.  
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Cohen’s d = .83).  Participants who were tested on Day 1 also included a higher 
proportion of the new D8 ideas in their essay responses (M = .08, SE = .01) than did 
participants who had restudied the Day 1 text (M = .04, SE = .01) (t(39) = 2.44, p = .02, 
Cohen’s d = .78).    
Question responses.  Some participants (e.g., participants who believed strongly 
in the efficacy of learning styles) may have failed to include critical ideas from the Day 1 
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text in their essay responses even though they had successfully learned these ideas.  To 
determine whether testing had enhanced the learning of these ideas even though tested 
participants failed to produce more of them on essay responses, we administered a set of 
six questions that were designed to as an additional assessment of the participants’ 
learning of critical ideas from the Day 1 text.  As predicted, tested participants integrated 
more critical D1 ideas (M = .10, SE = .01) into their question responses than did students 
who had restudied the Day 1 text (M = .07, SE = .01) (t(39) = 2.47,  p = .02, Cohen’s d = 
.79). 
Combined essay and question responses.   When responses to both the essay 
stem and the short-answer questions were combined (see Figure 6.2), it was revealed that 
tested participants produced more of all three types of ideas. Participants who were tested 
on Day 1 integrated a higher proportion of D1 ideas (M = .13, SE = .02) into their 
responses than did participants who had restudied the Day 1 text (M = .09, SE = .01) 
(t(39) = 2.06, p = .046, Cohen’s d = .66).  Participants who were tested on Day 1 also 
integrated more D1D8 ideas  (M = .26, SE = .02) into their critical essays than did 
participants who had restudied the Day 1 text (M = .17, SE = .02) (t(39) = 2.71, p = .01, 
Cohen’s d = .87).  The increased inclusion of D1 and D1D8 ideas reflects the enhanced 
learning of previously encountered information that was generated by testing.  The 
increased inclusion of D1 ideas also reflects a positive impact on critical comprehension, 
because it reflects an increased use of elaborative and qualifying information to critically 
evaluate a new text.  Participants who were tested on Day 1 also included a higher 
proportion of the new D8 ideas in their responses (M = .14, SE = .02) than did 
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participants who restudied the Day 1 text (M = .09, SE = .02) (t(39) = 2.26, p = .03, 
Cohen’s d = .72).  This reflects the potentiation of learning from a new text encountered a 
week after initial testing.   
 
Figure 6.2. Proportion of ideas units from the Day 1 text (D1), both texts (D1D8), and the 
Day 8 text (D8) included in essay and question responses as a function of Day 1 learning 
condition.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 Beliefs about learning styles.  For the most part, initial testing did not 
significantly influence participants’ levels of agreement with the Likert-type items (see 
Table 6.1).  However, there were two marginal effects worth noting.  Tested participants 
reported marginally lower levels of agreement with the statement “I believe there is 
strong evidence for learning styles” than did restudy participants.  Tested participants 
also reported marginally higher levels of agreement with the statement “I believe that 
other individual differences may be more important than learning styles” than did restudy 
participants.  These responses are congruent with a reduction in belief in learning styles 
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that was driven by testing on the Day 1 text that contained ideas that were critical of 
the construct.   
 
Table 6.1. Mean (SE) Likert-Type Item Responses by Day 1 Learning Condition. 
 Restudy 
Day 1  
Testing  
Day 1  
 
t(39) p 
I believe that different people learn 
information in different ways. 
5.56 (0.23) 5.4 (0.33) .39 .70 
I believe that instruction is most 
effective when it is provided in a 
mode that matches a learner’s style.  
4.56 (0.24) 4.4 (0.31) .40 .69 
I believe that there is strong evidence 
for learning styles. 
4.75 (0.32) 3.98 (0.3) 1.77 .08 
I believe that other individual 
differences may be more important 
than learning styles. 
5.12 (0.21) 5.65 (0.22) 1.70 .09 
I found the text interesting. 
 
4.56 (0.36) 5.25 (0.25) 1.62 .11 
I already knew a lot about the topics 
covered in the text. 
4.31 (0.3) 4.62 (0.28) .75 .45 
 
Note: Response options ranged from “1-Strongly Disagree “ to “7-Strongly Agree “. 
 
Beliefs and essay responses.  The participants’ responses to the Likert-type items 
as well as their critical essay responses allowed us to examine the potentially important 
interaction between testing and beliefs.  In order to test whether participants’ rates of 
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inclusion of critical (D1) ideas were influenced by their beliefs about learning styles, 
we used the Likert data collected on Day 8 to identify participants who strongly believed 
in learning styles (LS Believers) as well as participants who were more skeptical (LS 
Skeptics).  Specifically, we separated students into the two groups on the basis of their 
responses to the four statements that were designed to capture their beliefs in learning 
styles  (the first four statements in Table 6.1).  The internal consistency of these four 
items was acceptable (Cronbach’s alpha = .79 with the coding of the fourth statement 
reversed).  To divide participants into belief groups, we summed their responses to these 
four items (reversing the coding of the fourth statement) and performed a median split.  
Participants who had higher than median levels of agreement with these statements were 
classified as LS Believers (N = 23).  Participants who had lower than median levels of 
agreement with these statements were classified as LS Skeptics (N =18).   
To evaluate whether belief in learning styles influenced participants’ inclusion of 
critical ideas in their essay responses, we performed a 2 x 2 ANOVA on the proportion of 
D1 ideas included with Day 1 Learning Condition (Test, Restudy) and LS Belief (LS 
Believers, LS Skeptics) as between subjects factors.  The main effect of Belief (F (1,37) = 
9.87, MSe  = .03, p = .003) was significant, but the main effect of Learning Condition (F 
(1,37) = .96 , MSe = .002,  p = .33) was not.  These main effects were qualified by a 
significant Belief x Learning Condition interaction (F (1,37) = 6.87, MSe  = .02, p = .01) 
(see Figure 6.3).  Tested participants who were skeptical of learning styles included 
significantly more D1 ideas in their essays than did restudy participants who were 
skeptical (t(21) = 2.35,  p = .03, Cohen’s d = 1.03).  Tested participants who believed in 
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learning styles did not include significantly fewer or more D1 ideas in their essays than 
did restudy participants who also believed in learning styles (t(18) = 1.31 ,  p > .05).   
 
 
Figure 6.3. Interaction between beliefs and learning condition for the essay writing task.  
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Beliefs and question responses.  To evaluate whether belief in learning styles 
influenced the inclusion of critical information in question responses, we performed the 
same analysis.  The main effect of Belief (F (1,37) = 2.49, MSe  = 10.20, p = .12) was not 
significant, but the main effect of Learning Condition (F (1,37) = 6.61, MSe  = 27.00,  p 
= .01) was.  These main effects were qualified by a marginal Belief x Learning Condition 
interaction (F (1,37) = 2.82, MSe  = 25.13, p = .10) (see Figure 6.4).  Tested participants 
who were skeptical of learning styles included significantly more D1 ideas in their essays 
than did restudy participants who were skeptical (t(21) = 3.44,  p = .003, Cohen’s d = 
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1.50).  Tested participants who believed in learning styles did not include significantly 
more D1 ideas in their essays than did restudy participants who also believed in learning 
styles (t(18) = .18,  p > .05).   
 
 
Figure 6.4. Interaction between beliefs and learning condition for the short answer task.  
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Beliefs and the overall inclusion of critical ideas.  To evaluate whether belief in 
Learning Styles influenced the inclusion of critical information overall (in the combined 
essay and question responses), we performed the same analysis.  The main effects of 
Belief (F (1,37) = 6.32, MSe  = 59.63, p = .02) and Learning Condition (F (1,37) = 5.37, 
MSe  = 50.14, p = .03) were both significant.  These main effects were qualified by a 
significant Belief x Learning Condition interaction (F (1,37) = 5.31, MSe  = 50.09, p = 
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.03) (see Figure 6.5).  Tested participants who were skeptical of learning styles 
included significantly more D1 ideas in their essays than did restudy participants who 
were skeptical (t(21) = 3.29,  p = .003, Cohen’s d = 1.43).  Tested participants who 
believed in learning styles did not include significantly more D1 ideas in their essays than 
did restudy participants who also believed strongly in this educational philosophy (t(18) 
= .35,  p > .05).   
 
 
Figure 6.5. Interaction between beliefs and learning condition for the combined results 
(critical essay and short answer questions).  Error bars represent standard errors 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 demonstrate that testing can improve performance on 
two educationally relevant tasks, writing a critical essay and answering a set of short 
answer questions, by enhancing past learning and potentiating future learning from 
naturalistic expository texts.  Corroborating the prediction that testing enhances past 
learning, participants who were tested after reading an expository text that introduced key 
criticisms of learning styles learned more ideas from this text than did participants who 
simply restudied the text.  Corroborating the prediction that testing can potentiate future 
learning from related materials, participants who were tested on the critical text 
subsequently learned more ideas from a new text they read a week later that presented a 
contradictory argument.  This enhancement of past learning and potentiation of future 
learning enabled participants who were initially tested to produce richer essays and short 
answer question responses a week after testing.  
These results also demonstrate the powerful role that misconceptions play in test-
potentiated learning.   Participants’ performance was characterized by an interaction 
between their belief in learning styles and whether they had been tested on Day 1.  While 
participants who were skeptical of learning styles approaches to education integrated 
more ideas from the Day 1 text into their responses when they had been tested on it, 
participants who strongly believed in learning styles did not integrate more critical ideas 
from Day 1 text regardless of whether they had been tested.  Since beliefs were only 
assessed at the end of the experiment, it is not clear whether participants brought these 
beliefs with them to the experiment, or if these beliefs were influenced by exposure to the 
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experimental materials.  It is also unclear if this interaction reflects a failure for 
believers in learning styles to benefit from testing on a text that challenged their beliefs, 
or if this interaction reflects a failure to use ideas that were learned but that were not 
congruent with prior beliefs. 
These results represent a first step in translating the novel test-potentiated learning 
paradigm from the laboratory to the real world.  They demonstrate that testing can 
potentiate future performance on educationally relevant tasks.  However, they also 
demonstrate the complexity of translating a promising laboratory paradigm to real world 
problems, as evidenced by the interaction between participants’ beliefs and testing.  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
This dissertation proposed that testing can be used to produce generative 
knowledge bases that support future comprehension, learning, and conceptual change.  
This proposal was supported by the results of three experiments using naturalistic 
expository texts on topics in psychological science.  Experiments 1, 2, and 3 replicated 
the classic testing effect, showing superior delayed recall of tested versus restudied 
information.  Experiment 2 demonstrated for the first time that testing can be used to 
potentiate the learning of new information encountered after testing.  Experiment 3 
demonstrated the potential educational utility of this paradigm, showing that testing can 
also potentiate performance on educationally meaningful tasks like writing a critical 
essay. 
These findings are important for empirical, theoretical, and pragmatic reasons. 
Empirically, they extend previous demonstrations that testing on old information can 
potentiate transfer to new domains (Butler, 2010) and new tests (Carpenter & Delosh, 
1989; Glover, 1989; Kang et al. 2007, McDaniel et al., 2007). They also extend 
demonstrations that testing can potentiate the learning of old information that has been 
previously tested, but not successfully produced (Congleton & Rajaram, 2011; Izawa, 
1966, 1967).  Specifically, these results show that testing can also potentiate the learning 
of new information encountered for the first time after testing. Theoretically, these 
experiments provide evidence for the proposal that testing establishes generative 
knowledge bases, which in turn potentiate future learning.  These knowledge bases 
support successful comprehension because they are efficiently accessed.  Although we 
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have proposed that generativity derives from simple mechanisms such as fluency and 
similarity, generative knowledge bases are not limited to supporting learning from 
conceptually similar materials.  In fact, generative knowledge bases effectively support 
learning from materials that refute prior knowledge.  Pragmatically, these experiments 
demonstrate that testing can potentiate learning from rich, naturalistic texts, and not just 
the paired-associates and word lists used in most previous studies.  They also demonstrate 
that testing can potentiate learning and performance in the context of educationally 
relevant tasks.  In doing so, they establish the viability of testing for improving learning 
in educational contexts, including notoriously difficult forms of learning such as transfer 
and conceptual change. 
Mechanisms of Test Potentiation 
We have proposed that testing potentiates future learning by building a 
knowledge base that is generative, facilitating comprehension and learning from future 
texts.  One mechanism by which testing potentiates future learning is by increasing the 
fluency with which tested information is retrieved from LTM and integrated with new 
information.  There is some evidence from research with paired associates (e.g., Allen et 
al., 1969) that testing can increase the speed with which tested content is subsequently 
recalled.  However, it is unclear whether this finding generalizes to the retrieval and 
integration of textual ideas during online comprehension.  The results of Experiments 2 
and 3 are congruent with this proposal, but they do not provide direct evidence for 
fluency as a necessary mechanism for generativity.  Future research should employ 
online measures to more directly measure the contribution of fluent retrieval to future 
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learning.  Additionally, there are multiple ways in which testing may increase fluency 
as well as multiple ways in which fluent retrieval may potentiate learning. 
In addition to supporting the fluent integration of tested information, testing may 
also support future learning in an indirect fashion, by freeing up WM memory resources 
during the processing of new texts (Ericsson & Kintsch 1995).  This possibility is 
supported by previous research that has demonstrated that possessing relevant prior 
knowledge can reduce the information processing demands posed by a new text.  For 
example, Fincher-Kiefer, Post, Greene, and Voss (1988) compared resource availability 
in readers who had high versus low prior knowledge about baseball as they read 
sentences that either described actions from a baseball game or described neutral topics 
(e.g., a typical workplace scenario) about which all participants had equivalent prior 
knowledge.  Consistent with the prediction that prior knowledge frees up processing 
resources during comprehension, high-knowledge participants demonstrated higher 
working memory capacity when reading sentences about baseball than sentences about 
neutral topics, whereas low-knowledge participants had lower working memory capacity 
when reading sentences about baseball than sentences about everyday topics.  In the 
context of test-potentiated learning, prior testing on a related text may reduce the 
processing demands posed by a new text, thereby enabling participants to learn more 
from it.    
We have argued that the fluency of retrieval emerges from the similarity of 
featurally rich memory traces established through testing and new textual content, but 
fluency may also emerge from other mechanisms.  One candidate mechanism is the 
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superior organization of tested knowledge.  A considerable body of research with word 
lists has demonstrated that testing produces more organized knowledge relative to restudy 
(Bregman & Weiner, 1970; Congleton & Rajaram, 2011; Rosner, 1970; Zaromb & 
Roediger, 2010).  If this generalizes to learning from texts, then the improved 
organization of knowledge built by testing may increase the fluency of retrieval through 
mechanisms like those spelled out in Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) Long Term Working 
Memory Theory (LT-WM).  According to this theory, readers can dramatically expand 
the information that they have ready access to by keeping pointers to well-organized 
LTM structures in short term working memory. The potential role of organization in 
promoting the fluent access necessary for test-potentiated learning warrants further 
investigation. 
Similarity and Transfer 
The potentiation of future learning demonstrated in Experiments 2 and 3 represent 
cases of successful transfer of learning.  This expands on prior research that has 
demonstrated that testing can increase participants’ transfer from one initially tested 
domain to a new one (Butler, 2010) and from one initially tested format to a new one 
(e.g. Kang et al., 2007; McDaniel et al., 2007).  Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that 
testing can facilitate a third form of transfer, namely the learning of new information. As 
in all cases of transfer, it will be important to determine how “far” these benefits of 
testing transfer (Barnett & Ceci, 2002).   
The featural similarity of tested and new content is likely to be an important factor 
in determining how far testing transfers.  In Experiment 2, new (Day 8) texts were 
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carefully constructed to build upon ideas from the old (Day 1) texts.  This resulted in 
the use of similar wording across texts.  For example, the Day 1 text on discovery 
learning contained the sentence “When participants are allowed to discover scientific 
principles, they are conducting experiments just like a real scientist.” and the 
complementary Day 8 text contained the sentence “However, most students are not 
prepared to conduct experiments like a real scientist”.  These sentences are similar in 
both their surface wording (lexical similarity) and their underlying ideas (semantic 
similarity).  Because incoming text automatically evokes the retrieval of semantically and 
lexically similar memory traces through passive retrieval processes (Albrecht & O’Brien, 
1993; Cook et al., 1998; Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien et al., 1998), the featural 
similarity of the Day 8 texts likely played a key role in promoting the reactivation of 
memory traces built through testing on the related Day 1 text.  This automatic 
reactivation may have promoted the fluent integration of ideas into the participants’ 
emergent text representations.  
Because automatic memory processes do not tax a reader’s limited processing 
resources, reactivation driven by featural similarity may have also helped to minimize the 
processing needed for previously encountered ideas, thereby increasing the amount of 
new information that participants were able to learn from the new text.  If this is true, 
then the distance over which testing potentiates learning may be dependent upon the 
similarity of new materials to old, tested materials.  An interesting direction for future 
research will be to determine how similar new materials must be to originally tested 
materials for testing to potentiate learning.   
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Refutational Texts and Conceptual Change 
Although new ideas sometimes build directly upon prior knowledge, they often 
require a fundamental reconceptualization of old knowledge or beliefs (Carey, 1985; 
Posner et al., 1982; Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Vosniadou, 1994).  Unfortunately, 
people often have difficulty learning new ideas that counter previously held beliefs.  One 
established way to increase the learning of contradictory information is to explicitly 
refute previously held ideas (Guzzetti et al., 1993). The results of Experiment 2 suggest 
that testing can help to amplify the effects of explicit refutation, at least with respect to 
the acquisition of knowledge.  Testing on a text that presented erroneous ideas about 
discovery learning increased the amount of information that participants subsequently 
learned from new texts that refuted, qualified, and elaborated these ideas.  However, 
testing on a text that presented erroneous ideas about learning styles did not produce 
parallel gains.  This discrepancy may have been due to the stronger beliefs about the 
efficacy of learning styles that participants brought to the experiment and that prevented 
them from revising misconceptions.  This interpretation is supported by the results of 
Experiment 3 that showed that although participants who were skeptical of learning styles 
benefited from testing on ideas that were critical of these theories, participants who 
strongly believed in learning styles did not benefit from testing.   Although not 
conclusive, testing also potentiated marginal changes in beliefs about discovery learning 
(Experiment 2) and learning styles (Experiment 3).  This suggests that testing may be 
able to amplify attitudinal change as well as the reorganization of erroneous knowledge 
structures. 
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One explanation for why testing can precipitate conceptual change is that 
testing increases the fluency with which old information is retrieved, increasing the 
accessibility of conflicting information during the processing of a refutational text.  
Several researchers have posited that refutational text structures are particularly effective 
in promoting conceptual change because explicit refutation highlights the conflict 
between new information and previously held beliefs.  This results in the coactivation of 
conflicting information (van den Broek & Kendeou, 2008) which promotes cognitive 
conflict and conceptual change (Guzzetti et al., 1993).  Because testing increases the 
accessibility of previously tested ideas, it further increases the likelihood that new 
refutational texts will evoke the coactivation of novel ideas and conflicting information. 
Educational Implications 
The results of these three experiments represent a significant expansion of our 
understanding of the role of testing in learning.  They build upon upon the growing 
recognition of testing as more than a tool for assessing learning, and demonstrate that 
testing can be used to both enhance past learning and potentiate future learning.  
Critically for potential educational applications, these results demonstrate that testing can 
amplify conceptual change and enhance/potentiate learning from the types of rich 
materials that students are likely to encounter in the real world. 
The finding that testing enhances and potentiates learning from expository texts is 
particularly important for future educational applications given the centrality of 
expository texts to education and the difficulty many students experience comprehending 
and learning from expository sources.  Two key reasons that readers struggle to 
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comprehend expository texts are because they lack requisite prior knowledge (Chiesi et 
al., 1979; McNamara et al., 1996) and because the architecture of the human mind 
severely limits how effectively readers can integrate the knowledge they do have with 
textual information (Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Thibadeau et 
al., 1982).  Testing helps to address both of these shortcomings by helping readers to 
build a generative knowledge base that can be fluently integrated into their emerging 
representations of new texts read in the future.  Critically, testing does not simply 
promote the integration of tested knowledge “as is” but can even potentiate the revision 
of misconceived knowledge.  This result is particularly important given the need to 
combat non-scientific misconceptions and to improve scientific literacy. 
Test-potentiated learning is likely to promote learning form a broad array of 
materials.  Although the most direct application of this research is to improve learning 
from expository texts, test-potentiated learning is not limited to improving learning from 
expository or even textual materials.  As currently theorized, the mechanisms of test-
potentiated learning should be able to promote learning from any content that is featurally 
similar to tested content.  Clearly, this suggests that test-potentiated learning should 
extend to other forms of text and discourse, such as narrative texts or classroom lectures.  
It also suggests that test-potentiation could help with learning any materials characterized 
by featural similarity.  For example, testing could potentiate word learning in 
morphophonemic orthographies like Chinese by establishing memory traces which are 
subsequently evoked by new, featurally similar characters containing the same phonetic 
or semantic radicals.  Future work should investigate whether test-potentiation 
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generalizes to other expository text genres, to narrative texts, and to non-textual stimuli 
such as scientific visualizations (Hegarty, 2004; Johnson & Mayer, 2009).  This work 
should focus not only on whether testing can potentiate learning from these different 
types of materials, but also on finding ways to maximize this potentiation. 
Although these results significantly expand the emergent view of testing as a 
powerful tool for promoting learning, considerable work needs to be done before these 
results can be translated into educational practice.  There are significant differences 
between the type of learning that occurs in the context of psychological experimentation 
and the type of learning that occurs in real-world learning environments.  Additionally, 
psychological experimentation allows a level of control that is not always possible in 
educational settings.  It will be important to replicate these findings in the real-world 
before proposing any changes to educational practice. 
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Chapter 8: Future Directions 
There are two key directions for this research in the future.  The first direction is 
to further articulate the mechanisms that are at the heart of test-potentiated learning.  The 
central assumption of the proposed model is that testing improves future learning by 
increasing the fluency with which tested knowledge is subsequently retrieved, but there is 
more than one way in which testing can increase subsequent retrieval fluency.  
Determining how testing increases fluency (e.g. by altering the featural content and/or 
organization of memory traces) has profound implications not only for future inquiry into 
test-potentiation but also for our understanding of human memory and language 
comprehension.  The second direction for this research is to begin to leverage these 
findings to improve real world educational outcomes.  Ideally, this research will not only 
demonstrate the utility of test-potentiation in improving real world learning, but will also 
help to further articulate the mechanisms of test-potentiation and begin to have a 
measurable impact on the learning of actual students, especially the cultivation of 
scientific literacy. 
Articulating the Mechanisms of Test-Potentiation 
According to the proposed model, testing potentiates future comprehension by 
increasing the fluency with which tested content is retrieved in the future.  This fluent 
retrieval potentiates comprehension directly by increasing the likelihood that tested 
information will be integrated with new textual content and/or indirectly by freeing up 
WM memory resources during the processing of new texts.  We have proposed two 
mechanisms that may increase subsequent retrieval fluency.  According to the first 
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proposed mechanism, testing establishes featurally-rich memory traces that are 
subsequently evoked by related texts through automatic similarity-based LTM retrieval 
processes.  According to the second proposed mechanism, testing increases the 
organization of knowledge, increasing fluency by expanding the amount of information 
that readers can maintain in WM.  These mechanisms are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and future research should investigate both.   
Featural similarity.  A core assumption of the proposed model of test-potentiated 
learning as well as many modern models of text comprehension (e.g., McKoon et al., 
1996; Myers & O’Brien, 1998) and human memory (e.g. Hintzman, 1988; Murdock, 
1983; Ratcliff, 1978) is that passive retrieval processes evoke the activation of featurally 
similar memory traces.  Unfortunately, “featural similarity” has rarely been explicitly 
defined or operationalized with respect to text comprehension (for an exception, see 
Lewis & Mensink, 2012).  Additionally, the extant empirical evidence remains equivocal 
with respect to which features evoke memory traces.  For example, in an influential series 
of studies, target sentences like Mary ordered a cheeseburger and fries were found to 
evoke the automatic retrieval of information from source sentences like she refused to eat 
anything fried or cooked in grease (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Myers, O’Brien, 
Albrecht, & Mason, 1994; O’Brien et al., 1998).  The featural similarity of these 
sentences could be interpreted as shared referential (Mary), thematic (the agent), and/or 
semantic features (cheeseburger and eat/fried/grease).  In addition, other studies have 
implicated both phonological similarity (Lea et al., 2008) and lexical similarity (Lewis & 
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Mensink, 2012) as additional featural dimensions that may be relevant to online text 
comprehension and learning.   
This current theoretical and empirical equivocation means that it will be necessary 
to not only demonstrate that testing produces featurally-rich memory traces, but to 
actually articulate which features are relevant to fluent text comprehension.  One way to 
do this is to systematically manipulate the surface and semantic features of the texts that 
participants encounter after testing and to directly measure the impact this featural 
manipulation has on the retrieval of tested information.  During an initial learning 
session, participants would read a text that contains multiple source sentences.  These 
source sentences would contain at least one key source idea that would not be repeated in 
future texts.  After a delay, participants would read a new text that contains target 
sentences which systematically vary in the their semantic, lexical, phonological, 
referential, and thematic similarity to source sentences, but do not repeat the key source 
ideas.  Immediately after reading these sentences, the retrieval of a source idea would be 
assessed by having participants name or make a lexical decision on a word related to the 
source idea.  The featural richness of memory traces would be reflected by faster naming 
and lexical decision responses following a wide array of target sentences.  The relevance 
of different types of featural similarity would be implicated by variation in the efficacy of 
different target sentences in reducing response latencies.  For example, semantically 
similar cues may be more effective than lexically similar cues in evoking the retrieval of 
memory traces.  
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Investigating the question of featural similarity will also help to answer key 
questions with respect to the application of test-potentiation to real world learning 
problems.  Chief among these is the question of how “far” the benefits of testing transfer 
(cf., Barnett & Ceci, 2002).  Determining how similar tested and new materials must be is 
a first step in deciding when testing should be inserted into real-world curricula in order 
to facilitate the transfer of currently studied content to content that will be presented in 
the future.  For example, this research may suggest that it is beneficial to break textbook 
chapters into small sections with tests after each one.  That way, testing can enhance the 
learning of content from early in a chapter and potentiate the learning of content later in a 
chapter.  
 Organization. Future research should also investigate testing’s effect on the 
organization of knowledge built from expository texts as well as the ways in which this 
organization can facilitate subsequent comprehension.  Previous research has 
demonstrated that testing can increase the subjective and/or taxonomical organization of 
participants’ subsequent retrieval of word lists (Bregman & Weiner, 1970; Congleton & 
Rajaram, 2011; Rosner, 1970; Zaromb & Roediger, 2010), but there is no relevant 
evidence regarding the organization of textual information.  Because organization may be 
play an important role in promoting the fluency of readers’ access to tested information, 
it will also be important to determine whether any increases in organization are 
accompanied by increases in accessibility.  The traditional approach to measuring 
testing’s effect on organization has been to calculate measures of clustering in 
participants’ recalls, such as ARC scores (Roenker et al., 1971).  Using clustering metrics 
 86 
to analyze recalls from multi-topic texts (as opposed to the single topic texts used in 
this experiment) will be a good first step in investigating testing’s effect on the 
organization of text representations.  However, clustering metrics will not help to uncover 
the role that this organization may play in fluent retrieval.   
To investigate the role of organization in fluent retrieval, it will be important to 
use paradigms that can probe both structure and retrieval latency.  One such approach is 
the priming paradigm created by Ratcliff and McKoon (1978)  (see also Lewis & Varma, 
2011; Zwaan, 1996).  In this paradigm, participants make judgments on lists of 
statements derived from earlier texts while their reaction times are recorded.  Within 
these lists, target statements are preceded by different prime statements.  If judging a 
prime statement speeds participants’ target judgments, the information represented by the 
prime and target statements are assumed to be connected in LTM.  In the context of test-
potentiated learning, priming paradigms will help to determine whether testing increases 
the organization of text representations as well as whether this organization speeds the 
retrieval of connected information. 
Establishing and Maximizing Educational Utility  
There is a growing recognition that testing is more than a tool for assessing 
learning.  The consensus that testing can solidify students’ memory for previously 
encountered information has lead the Institute of Education Sciences to identify testing as 
one of only two instructional practices with a “strong” level of empirical support (Pashler 
et al., 2007).  This dissertation suggests an even more radical reconceptualization of the 
role of testing in education, suggesting that testing can be integral not only to solidifying 
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memory for previously encountered information, but also to building generative 
knowledge that will support future learning.  Demonstrating that this model generalizes 
to more naturalistic learning environments will require pervasive real world 
experimentation.  If conducted properly, this experimentation will not only establish the 
educational utility of test-potentiated learning, but will also help to tease apart the 
underlying mechanisms of test-potentiation by subjecting the model to testing with rich 
naturalistic materials and students who vary with respect to important individual 
differences.  
One approach that has been used to demonstrate the educational utility of testing 
has been to investigate testing’s impact on learning in “simulated classrooms” (e.g., 
Butler & Roediger, 2007).  In these simulated classrooms, students learn short lessons, 
take tests designed to enhance learning, and complete summative assessments of their 
knowledge.  The primary benefit of simulated classrooms is that they allow a level of 
control that is not possible in the real world.  The drawbacks of simulated classrooms are 
that they test a limited range of materials and students, have no direct impact on real-
world learning outcomes, and sacrifice many of the online measures (like reading times 
and probe response latencies) that are critical to measuring real-time cognition. 
Therefore, we argue for a more pervasive, more technologically sophisticated approach to 
studying test potentiation in educational contexts. 
One particularly intriguing platform for investigating test-potentiation in the real 
world is digital textbooks.  By their very nature, digital texts are conducive to the 
systematic manipulation of text characteristics (e.g. lexical, semantic, and phonological 
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features) and test features (e.g. test format and spacing) that is necessary for teasing 
apart the mechanisms of test-potentiation and for identifying best practices.  Additionally, 
digital texts can be easily distributed to a wide array of students at multiple sites 
increasing the ecological validity of results and enabling an investigation of important 
individual characteristics such as prior knowledge, beliefs, and reading ability.  As results 
are produced, they can be automatically forwarded to researchers, enabling the rapid 
analysis of data and a “design-build” approach to text/test construction.  As the latencies 
for digital reading devices such as tablet computers improve, researchers will be able to 
collect online data which will enable a more direct assessment of students’ cognition than 
test results alone.  For example, researchers will be able to investigate the fluency with 
which readers integrate tested and new information by analyzing reading times for new 
content.  As the cameras on these devices improve, it will even be possible to collect 
usable eye-movement data that can help to further elucidate the impact of previous 
testing on online comprehension. 
The superordinate goal for this research should be to investigate how testing can 
be employed to promote the type of nuanced scientific literacy that few students achieve.  
Scientific literacy requires a continuous revision of old knowledge and beliefs.  The 
proposed model of test potentiated learning provides a new perspective on how we can 
help students learn new ideas that expand, qualify, and refute old knowledge.  However, 
there is considerable work that needs to be done in order to maximize the utility of testing 
in promoting conceptual change and scientific literacy.  For example, it will be important 
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to further explore the interaction of beliefs and testing, and to identify methods for 
maximizing the conceptual change of learners who hold strong, erroneous beliefs.   
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Appendix A 
Day 1 Pro Learning Styles Text (Experiments 1 and 2) 
 
It is clear that people think and learn in different ways.  Like most people, you 
have probably had a teacher who just did not work for you.  This was probably due to the 
fact that the teacher’s instructional style did not match your learning style.  More and 
more educators are recognizing that some people learn visually, others learn verbally, and 
still others learn kinesthetically.  Students learn best when instruction matches their 
particular style.  For example, a visual learner learns best with visual instruction and a 
verbal learner learns best with verbal instruction.   
One way to address individuals’ learning styles is to teach a topic in multiple 
ways.  There is good evidence that this type of broad instruction is more effective than 
the narrower type of instruction that teachers have traditionally used.  Broad instruction 
helps everyone and works because teaching a topic in multiple ways simultaneously 
targets the different learning styles of different students. 
Although good teaching is definitely characterized by teaching the same concept 
in multiple ways; if we want to truly maximize student learning, we need to start tailoring 
instruction directly to the individual styles of students.  There is strong evidence that 
matching instructional format to a student’s style maximizes learning.  Additionally, 
when students receive instruction that matches their style, they are much happier and 
more engaged in the lesson. 
Every student is an individual and deserves to be treated like one.  Only by 
tailoring teaching to every student’s learning style, can we respect this individuality.  To 
do this, we need to start assessing the learning style of every student and giving them 
appropriate instruction.  Luckily, there are easy and reliable ways to identify students’ 
learning styles.  There are many excellent learning styles assessments and books for sale.  
There are even some free assessments available on the internet.  These assessments 
accurately measure learning styles by asking people to rate their agreement with simple 
statements. 
Once we have determined every student’s learning style, we need to group 
students by style and give them customized instruction.  This is well within the means of 
most school districts.  In fact, many model schools across the country have already 
implemented educational interventions based on learning styles theories.  The wide 
spread recognition of distinct learning styles has been one of the most important 
revolutions in education.  If we pay attention to learning styles theories, we can 
dramatically improve learning. 
 
Day 1 Pro Discovery Learning Text (Experiments 1 and 2) 
 
Discovery learning is an exciting new idea.  In discovery learning, students “learn 
by doing”.  In one particularly effective physics lesson, young students learn about basic 
physics principles by freely manipulating an adjustable ramp.  They learn about friction 
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by changing the surface of the ramp from rough sandpaper to smooth linoleum.  They 
learn about acceleration by adjusting the ramp’s slope and rolling a ball down it.   
A student can learn more by actively conducting experiments than by listening to 
a lecture.  A major strength of discovery learning is that students engage in the same 
activities as experts.  When students are allowed to discover scientific principles, they are 
conducting experiments just like a real scientist.  Like a scientist, they generate and test 
hypotheses.  Also like a scientist, students encounter roadblocks that they must find a 
way around.  As a result, they are learning real-world skills that could never be taught 
through direct instruction.   
As the name “discovery learning” implies, students literally “discover” the 
concepts and rules of a new domain.  For example, when students are asked to solve 
novel algebra problems with no guidance, they must explore the myriad possible routes to 
a solution that exist for every math problem.  This might involve a considerable amount 
of trial and error.  As a result, students develop critical problem-solving skills. 
Students learn best when they construct knowledge themselves.  The active 
learning fostered by discovery learning is the only way to guarantee that students 
construct their own knowledge.  Additionally, discovery learning benefits all types of 
students.  The amount of previous experience that students have with a domain does not 
matter.  
One of the major goals of education is to promote transfer.  Transfer is the ability 
to apply previously learned concepts to new problems.  Discovery learning is more 
effective than direct instruction in promoting transfer.  Because they have already 
encountered significant hurdles during learning, students who learn through discovery are 
better able to apply previously learned concepts to new problems in the future.  
In successful teaching, a teacher’s role should be radically altered.  Teachers 
should not lecture or offer students explicit guidance.  Instead a teacher should establish 
learning goals and allow students to discover relevant features of a problem on their own.  
To maximize learning, teachers should not intervene when students struggle.  This does 
not reduce a teacher’s involvement in education, it transforms it.  Instead of preparing 
lectures that students will passively consume, teachers should design active learning 
experiences. 
 
Day 8 Anti Learning Styles Text (Experiment 2) 
 
The idea that people learn in different ways has grown in popularity in recent 
years.  Most learning styles theories claim that some people learn verbally and others 
learn visually.  The appeal of these theories is often based on anecdotal evidence like 
most people’s experience that some teacher just did not work for them.  Unfortunately, 
there is no strong evidence that learning is best when instructional format matches a 
student’s putative style. 
Although there are many ideas about how learning styles can improve education, 
the most popular idea is the meshing hypothesis.  The meshing hypothesis is the idea that 
learning is best when the mode of instruction matches an individual’s style.  For example, 
a common claim is that a visual learner will learn best when information is presented 
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visually.  Although students are definitely happier when they receive instruction that 
matches their preferred style, they do not appear to learn more.   
For example, consider a study by Massa and Mayer (2006).  The researchers first 
gave students a series of learning styles assessments.  Next, they randomly assigned them 
to an electronics lesson that emphasized either the visual or verbal presentation of ideas.  
Finally, they gave students a test to assess their learning.  Contrary to the predictions of 
the meshing hypothesis, “verbal students” did not learn better with verbal instruction and 
“visual students” did not learn better with visual instruction. 
A weaker version of the learning styles idea is the claim that good instruction is 
characterized by teaching concepts in multiple ways.  According to these claims, broad 
instruction works because teachers are able to target multiple learning styles at the same 
time.  There is some evidence that broad instruction is better than narrow instruction.  
However, this evidence does not mean that learning is improved because broad 
instruction targets multiple learning styles.  Instead, broader instruction may work 
because the human brain has evolved to learn from multiple senses working together.  
Therefore, broad instruction may help everyone in a similar way. 
Tailoring instruction to the learning styles of every student would be incredibly 
expensive.  This would be expensive because students would need to be assessed, 
grouped by style, and then given customized instruction.  Teaching to learning styles 
would require the creation of new teaching methods.  Additionally, teachers would need 
to be trained in these methods, and more teachers would need to be hired to teach to 
every style. 
Many advocates of learning styles approaches to education claim that there are 
easy and reliable ways to identify students’ styles.  Unfortunately, most learning styles 
assessments do not actually measure styles.  Instead, they measure students’ preferences.  
For example, there are many online assessments that ask people to rate their agreement 
with statements like “I prefer to read instructions about how to do something rather than 
have someone show me”.  Learning preferences are very real, but they do not reflect how 
people actually learn best.   
We all agree that students should be treated as individuals, but learning styles 
based education is neither the only way nor the best way to respect students’ 
individuality. It may be more effective to target instruction to other differences such as 
differences in general aptitude or personality.   
 
Day 8 Anti Discovery Learning Text (Experiment 2) 
 
Discovery learning is not a new idea.  Similar approaches to learning have gone 
by many names, including inquiry learning, problem-based learning, and experiential 
learning.  Proponents of discovery learning often claim that students "learn by doing".  
However, it is not always true that students learn more by conducting an experiment than 
by listening to a lecture.  Despite the hopes of many teachers, students are unlikely to 
learn physics principles by simply manipulating a ramp or a set of springs with little 
guidance.   
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Many science teachers believe that a major strength of discovery learning is 
that students engage in the same types of activities as experts.  However, most students 
are not prepared to conduct experiments like a real scientist.  Scientists have considerable 
background knowledge that students do not, so the experiences of scientists and students 
are very different.  Without guidance or instruction, students may not be able to generate 
and test hypotheses, at least not meaningful ones. 
In many cases, students do not "discover" the rules of a domain.  Discovery 
learning often involves a lot of trial and error, and therefore students may never 
successfully discover appropriate concepts.  This is especially true in mathematics.  
Because math problems have multiple routes to a solution, students may never select the 
right one on their own.   
Additionally, discovery learning may have emotional consequences.  For example 
when students are asked to solve math problems with no guidance, they often get 
frustrated.  Not every type of student benefits from discovery learning.  In fact, discovery 
learning may only benefit students who already have fairly high background knowledge 
about a domain.  Background knowledge and prior experience can reduce the demands 
that discovery learning places on cognitive resources. 
In addition to not promoting initial learning, there is no strong evidence that 
discovery learning improves students’ ability to apply learned concepts to new problems.  
It is often claimed that discovery learning is more effective than direct instruction in 
promoting transfer.  However, this claim has not received empirical support.  For 
example, Klahr and Nigam (2004) conducted an experiment in which they compared 
students’ ability to apply knowledge to new situations.  Students learned about basic 
scientific principles either through discovery learning or direct instruction.  Students who 
learned through discovery did not learn more and were no better at applying basic 
scientific principles to new problems.    
Calls for discovery learning often appeal to the educational philosophy of 
Constructivism.  According to Constructivism, students learn best when they construct 
knowledge.  However, the visible activity fostered by discovery learning is not the only 
way to guarantee that learners construct knowledge.  Proponents of discovery learning 
often confuse visible activity with mental activity.  Students rarely passively consume 
lectures and can learn as much or more from a lecture than from discovery. 
Many proponents of discovery learning claim that teachers should not intervene 
when students struggle, but the research suggests that teachers can help students learn by 
intervening.  According to new models of “guided” discovery, a teacher’s role should not 
be radically altered.  Unlike "pure" discovery, in "guided" discovery teachers help 
students by pointing out salient features of a problem and by providing help at key 
moments.  Unlike pure discovery, guided discovery may be a valuable addition to every 
teacher’s toolkit. 
  
 111 
Appendix B 
Day 1 Anti Learning Styles Text (Experiment 3) 
 
The educational literature is filled with claims that individuals differ with respect to the 
way they learn.  For example, many popular theories differentiate between “verbal” and 
“visual” learning styles.  Proponents of learning styles argue that optimal learning 
requires assessing an individual’s learning style and tailoring instruction accordingly.  
However, there is no strong scientific evidence to support this claim. 
 One of the most popular ideas amongst proponents of learning styles is the 
“meshing hypothesis”.  According to the meshing hypothesis, instruction is most 
effective when it is provided in a format that matches the learning style of an individual. 
For example, a visual learner is assumed to learn best when concepts are illustrated with 
visual-aids.  
 Proponents of the meshing hypothesis often appeal to anecdotal evidence to 
support their claims.  The learning styles literature is filled with personal stories about 
educational successes and failures.   Perhaps learning styles advocates resort to this 
anecdotal evidence because the results of high-quality research studies rarely support 
strong claims like the meshing hypothesis.  Consider a study by Massa and Mayer (2006).  
They had students take a series of learning styles assessments and then randomly 
assigned them to an electronics lesson that emphasized either the visual or verbal 
presentation of ideas.  Next, they gave students a test to assess their learning.  Contrary to 
the predictions of learning styles theories, “verbal students” did not learn better with 
verbal instruction and “visual students” did not learn better with visual instruction.  
 A weaker version of the learning styles position contends that broad instruction is 
better than narrow instruction.  According to these weaker claims, good instruction is 
characterized by teaching concepts in multiple ways.  By teaching in multiple ways, a 
teacher is assumed to target the learning styles of many students during the same lesson.  
There is some limited evidence that broader instruction is associated with improved 
learning.   However, this does not support stronger claims like the meshing hypothesis.  
Students may learn better when instruction is delivered in multiple ways not because it 
targets their individual learning styles, but because the human brain has evolved to learn 
through multiple senses working in unison.  
 An important distinction that is rarely made is the distinction between “styles” 
and “preferences”.  Most learning style assessments do not measure how a person 
actually learns.  Instead, they measure how a person prefers to learn or to study.  Study 
preferences are very real, but they are not the same as learning styles.  When students are 
allowed to choose an instructional format that matches their study preferences, they tend 
to report higher levels of satisfaction.  However, they do not appear to learn more.  
 Teaching to putative learning styles is likely to be expensive.  Students must first 
be assessed and grouped by learning style and then given some sort of customized 
instruction.  Delivering customized instruction will require the creation and validation of 
instructional activities for each learning style.  Partitioning children within a given 
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classroom and teaching each subset differently might require increasing the number 
of teachers.  
 If there is no strong evidence that tailoring instruction to students’ learning styles 
increases learning, why is the learning styles idea so popular?  One reason for the 
popularity of learning styles are the commercial interests involved.  Publishers 
aggressively market a broad range of books and assessments.  Another reason for the 
popularity of learning styles is the widely held belief that all students should be treated by 
educators as unique individuals.  However, rejecting learning styles approaches to 
education does not mean rejecting individuality.  In fact, it may allow educators to focus 
on differences between students that are more important to educational outcomes such as 
differences in aptitude or personality. 
 
Day 8 Pro Learning Styles Text (Experiment 3) 
 
People learn and think in different ways.  You have probably taken a course where the 
teacher’s mode of instruction just did not work for you.  Although I am now a successful 
research psychologist, I struggled to earn a C in my first statistics class.  I put in hours of 
work, but I could never grasp the fundamental concepts. Everything changed when my 
next statistics teacher showed me a new way to look at statistics.  Instead of describing 
the key concepts verbally, he presented them geometrically. My previous teacher had 
been describing everything with words and I had struggled.  My new teacher presented 
ideas visually, and I thrived.    
 Luckily, a lot has changed since I was student.  One of the most important 
revolutions has been the wide spread recognition of distinct learning styles.  More and 
more educators are recognizing that some students learn visually, other verbally, and still 
other kinesthetically.  By matching the presentation of information to an individual’s 
style, an individual’s learning can be maximized. 
 It is important to assess each student’s learning style.  There are reliable and easy 
ways to identify a student’s learning style.  Some of these are commercially available.  
Others are available for free on the internet.  For example, one online assessment asks 
students to rate their agreement with statements like “I prefer to read instructions about 
how to do something rather than have someone show me”.  Students are much happier 
when they receive instruction that matches their responses on assessments like this. 
 There is strong evidence that aligning instructional style with a student’s learning 
style improves learning.  For example, Sternberg et al. (1998) compared the effects of 
instruction that targeted multiple styles of learning to more traditional instruction that 
only targeted one style.  The middle school students they studied learned better when 
they received the broader type of instruction than when they received the narrower, more 
traditional instruction.    
 Assessments can help teachers to identify their current teaching style as well as to 
identify their students’ individual learning styles.  I strongly suggest that teachers 
consider purchasing one of the excellent books available at the web site of the 
International Learning Styles Network (www.learningstyles.net).  These books can help 
teachers to tailor their teaching to the individual needs of their students.  
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 Each student is an individual and deserves an education that recognizes it.  By 
tailoring instruction to each student’s learning style, we can maximize learning and 
ensure that each student receives the individualized education they deserve.   We need to 
start assessing each student’s learning style and partitioning our classrooms to ensure that 
each student is taught in the most appropriate way. 
 
Day 8 Questions (Experiment 3) 
 
1- What version or versions of the learning styles idea does this week’s author support? 
 
2-What type or types of evidence does the author appeal to?  Why do you think the 
author appeals to this type of evidence? 
 
3-What types of conclusions does the study the author cited support?  Are there any 
alternative interpretations? 
 
4- What does the online assessment the author described probably measure?  Why is this 
important?   
 
5- What would be the economic consequences of the author’s plan?  Be specific. 
6-Why might this argument appeal to a lot of people? 
 
